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ABSTRACT 
One of the goals routinely ascribed to international criminal law 
(“ICL”) prosecutions is the ability to improve the rule of law 
domestically in post-atrocity states. This Article reassesses the 
common assumption that the relationship between the pursuit of ICL 
accountability and improving the rule of law in post-atrocity states is 
necessarily a linear, wholly positive one. It does so through an analysis 
of the relationship between the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia and the rule of law domestically in Cambodia. Through 
this analysis, this Article highlights the oft-ignored possibility that ICL 
prosecutions may actually have a mix of positive, nil, and negative 
effects on the domestic rule of law, at least in the short run. In the 
Cambodian context, this Article argues that such risk is quite real and 
arguably, in the process of being realized. These harmful rule of law 
consequences are most visible when viewed in light of the 
particularities of Cambodia’s rule of law deficit, which increasingly 
stems from government practices of subverting the rule of law through 
means obscured behind façades of legality. The ECCC’s tacit 
toleration of the Cambodian government’s apparent interference with 
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the Court’s work risks legitimating the notion that the rule of law is 
mere window dressing, rather than anything of substance in even the 
most basic, procedural sense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International criminal justice is often presented as having a 
positive effect on the rule of law both internationally and domestically 
in post-atrocity states. Internationally, institutions such as the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) are often characterized as 
promoting the rule of law by combatting impunity for the most serious 
international crimes.1 While there is much to be said concerning the 
 
1. For an example of such a characterization, see Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the 
International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity and Establishing the Rule of Law, UN CHRON. 
(2012), https://unchronicle.un.org/article/role-international-criminal-court-ending-impunity-
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relationship between international criminal justice and the concept of 
an international rule of law, this Article focuses exclusively on the 
relationship between international criminal justice and the rule of law 
at the domestic level, specifically in post-atrocity states. Within this 
context, the pursuit of international criminal law (“ICL”) 
accountability is commonly presented as an integral part of a broader 
project of establishing a liberal, human rights-based rule of law in 
societies devastated by atrocity.2 According to this standard narrative, 
atrocity crimes tend to occur amidst a climate of social chaos marked 
partially by a complete breakdown in the rule of law.3 International 
 
and-establishing-rule-law [https://perma.cc/S8MY-57HE] (last visited June 22, 2018) (“Without 
the rule of law, impunity reigns. By punishing violations of international legal norms and by 
promoting adherence to these norms, the ICC and the wider Rome Statute system play an 
important part in advancing the rule of law, thereby reducing impunity.”). For a critique of the 
anti-impunity turn within international human rights discourses, see generally Karen Engle, 
Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 
(2015). 
2. For a widely cited example of this standard transitional justice narrative, see RUTI G 
TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28 (2000) (observing that the argument that impunity for 
criminal behavior for ordinary domestic crimes entail serious negative social consequences “is 
apparently stronger in [post-atrocity transitional contexts] because in the conditions of prior 
lawlessness, expectations are greater of the impact of even isolated acts of accountability on rule 
of law. For these are extraordinary circumstances of past injustices, often state sponsored. It is 
against this backdrop that the argument from impunity takes on new meaning. In this context, 
the exercise of criminal justice is thought to best undo past state justice and to advance the 
normative transformation of these times to a rule-of-law system.”). For a helpful overview of 
the centrality of domestic rule of law improvement to the aims of transitional justice efforts, 
including the pursuit of ICL accountability, along with a critique of some of the assumptions 
embedded in this dominant narrative, see PÁDRAIG MCAULIFFE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
RULE OF LAW RECONSTRUCTION: A CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP 180–223 (2013). 
3. For an articulation of the notion that atrocities mostly occur amidst environments of 
social chaos marked by a complete breakdown in the rule of law, see Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-
Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. 
& FOREIGN AFF. 77, 100–01 (2009). This position is, of course, contingent on one’s underlying 
conceptualization of law itself and can be traced back to the well-known debate between H.LA. 
Hart and Lon Fuller concerning the nature of legality, including for example, whether the 
German Nazi regime adhered to the rule of law. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation 
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); cf. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, HARV. L. REV. 630, 630–72 (1958). More recently, David 
Kennedy has argued that international law increasingly enables, rather than constrains atrocity 
commission, by legalizing, and thereby normalizing warfare. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR 
AND LAW (2006). While there is much to these debates, an analysis of the accuracy of the claim 
that genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes tend to primarily occur amidst a general 
climate of social chaos, including the fundamental breakdown of the rule of law, is outside the 
scope of the present inquiry, which is more narrowly focused on the role of ICL in improving 
the rule of law in post-atrocity states. For descriptions of the effects of periods of atrocity 
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criminal justice institutions, especially those located on-site in post-
atrocity states, may thus, be seen as stepping into a veritable legal void 
in the wake of atrocity. Operating within this perceived absence of law, 
such institutions are commonly portrayed by their proponents–and 
quite often actively portray themselves–as, amongst other things, 
sowing the seeds for the reconstruction of the rule of law by combatting 
impunity while upholding fair trial standards and more generally 
demonstrating how the law ought to be administered.4 
Determining the accuracy of this presumption that ICL 
prosecutions are innately beneficial to the rule of law in post-atrocity 
states is a difficult task. The rule of law itself remains a contested 
concept, rendering it a moving target and making general assessments 
difficult.5 Meanwhile, ICL continues to be selectively applied and 
deeply politicized, thereby undermining its own rule of law credentials 
according to most mainstream rule of law definitions.6 Thus, even if 
 
commission on the rule of law and legal infrastructure, see John Coughlan, Sana Ghouse & 
Richard Smith, The Legacy of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Maintaining the Status Quo of 
Cambodia’s Legal and Judicial System, 4 AMSTERDAM L. F. 16, 16–17 (2012); Jane E. 
Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after Conflict: What Impact on Building the 
Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 251–52 (2007) [hereinafter Stromseth, Pursuing 
Accountability]. 
4. MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 88–93. McAuliffe argues specifically that “the 
expressivist role of trial presents criminal justice as the culmination of a [linear] redemptive 
chronicle. In this schema, democracy, justice, rights and the rule of law are inextricably linked.” 
Id. at 84. For an additional discussion of this narrative, see, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Justice on the 
Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Societies?, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 87 (2009) [hereinafter Stromseth, Justice on the Ground]. 
This is not to suggest that the rule of law movement, especially as it pertains to the relationship 
between the Global North and Global South, is not itself, often deeply problematic. There are 
many deeply critical observations to be made concerning the neoliberal and neocolonial 
underpinnings of many mainstream rule of law frameworks and activities. This Article is not 
intended as a defense of rule of law-building projects generally, but rather a critique of the 
tendency to uncritically accept the unproven assumption that ICL prosecutions can only help to 
improve the rule of law domestically within post-atrocity states. For an example of such 
criticisms, see generally Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and 
the ‘Rule of Law,’” 101 MICHIGAN L. REV. 2275 (2003). 
5. For an overview of the various ways in which the rule of law is conceptualized at both 
the international and domestic levels, see Henrik Andersen, Hybrid Courts and Multilevel Rules 
of Law: Some Overall Considerations, Challenges and Opportunities, 6 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY 
& SOC. 117, 117–21 (2017). 
6.  On the selectivity of ICL and its implications, see ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 
(2005). On the politicization of ICL, see generally, CONTESTED JUSTICE: THE POLITICS AND  
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT INTERVENTIONS, (Christian De Vos, Sara 
Kendall, & Carsten Stahn eds., 2015). For analysis of the relationship between criminal 
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one adopts a rather rudimentary model of the rule of law as a means of 
reducing “arbitrariness through general rules applied juridically,”7 it 
remains unclear how ICL is able to teach principles which it does not 
itself appear to adhere to. Moreover, in post-atrocity states themselves, 
while building the rule of law tends to be framed as a largely 
technocratic, value-neutral endeavor,8 the ways in which “law” and the 
“rule of law” are locally conceptualized invariably fluctuates.9 These 
factors all seem to militate against one-size-fits-all approaches to post-
atrocity rule of law building, which may or may not address the 
particularized rule of law challenges presented by each individual 
situation.10 While these and other potential pitfalls have led some to 
question whether the imposition of ICL accountability actually presents 
a clear pathway for improving the rule of law in post-atrocity states,11 
ICL institutions and international criminal justice advocates continue 
to regularly claim that ICL prosecutions represent a pathway towards 
positive rule of law outcomes integral to the social, political, and legal 
reconstruction of post-atrocity states.12 
 
prosecutions, transitional justice and the rule of law, see MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 123-223. 
7. Nick Cheesman, Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposite to the Rule of Law, 6 HAGUE 
J. ON RULE L. 96, 96 (2014). 
8. See, e.g., Sara Kendall, Donors’ Justice: Recasting International Criminal 
Accountability, 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 585, 591 (2011). 
9.  See Thom Ringer, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for 
a Common Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place in Development Theory and 
Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. L.J. 178, 185–87 (2007). 
10. See MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 88–89; see also Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability, 
supra note 3; Stromseth, Justice on the Ground, supra note 4. 
11. For example, Stromseth concludes that the effects of ICL accountability processes “on 
domestic rule of law have been mixed, complex, and often unclear, and more research is needed 
to fully understand their longer-term impact.” See Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability, supra 
note 3, at 319. McAuliffe meanwhile, is more critical of the assumption that the pursuit of 
criminal accountability for past atrocity crimes will necessarily improve the rule of law in 
transitional states. See Pádraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law: The Perfect 
Couple or Awkward Bedfellows?, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 110, 127–54 (2010). 
12. For an articulation of this claim, see TEITEL, supra note 2, at 28. For an example of 
this claim being advanced in relationship to the policies of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
within the context of its approach to complementarity, see Justine Tillier, The ICC Prosecutor 
and Positive Complementarity: Strengthening the Rule of Law?, 13 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 507, 
511 (2013) (arguing that “the practices of the [ICC Office of the Prosecutor] can contribute to 
strengthen the Rule of Law in situation countries.”). For an example of such a claim being made 
in relation to the ICC’s complementarity regime within the specific context of rule of law reform 
efforts in Kenya, see Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The Role 
of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. DEV. 
L.J. 26 (2011). For an example of such a claim being made by an international criminal justice 
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This Article reassesses the relationship between the pursuit of ICL 
accountability and the rule of law in post-atrocity states. It does so by 
examining the relationship between the rule of law in Cambodia and 
ICL accountability efforts ongoing at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”),13 focusing specifically on the rule 
of law ramifications of the longstanding controversy concerning how 
many individuals the Court will ultimately try. This case study is 
selected for several reasons. First, as a hybrid international criminal 
justice institution housed within the existing Cambodian judiciary and 
located on-site in Cambodia, the ECCC exemplifies the common 
assumption that localized justice will produce enhanced localized rule 
of law benefits.14 Second, the Court and its backers have themselves 
touted the ECCC’s potential for improving the rule of law in 
Cambodia.15 Third, despite years of formal legal reforms and extensive 
rule of law building efforts, Cambodia continues to suffer from an 
extreme rule of law deficit,16 making the Court’s effects in this area 
especially important to everyday life in contemporary Cambodia. 
 
institution itself, see Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, THE ECCC AT A 
GLANCE (2014), https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%
20-%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7CE-4KAN] (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2018) (stating that the Court “is expected to bring justice to Cambodians, strengthen 
rule of law in the country and promote national reconciliation.”) (emphasis added). Alexander 
Hinton views such assumptions as tied into a broader “transitional justice imaginary,” which he 
argues obscures more complex, localized understandings of justice and the like. See generally 
ALEXANDER HINTON, THE JUSTICE FACADE: TRIALS OF TRANSITION IN CAMBODIA (2016) 
[hereinafter HINTON, JUSTICE FACADE]. 
13. The ECCC, also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, is a hybrid United Nations-
Cambodian tribunal with jurisdiction over various domestic and international crimes committed 
in Cambodia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979). See generally JOHN D. 
CIORCIARI & ANNE HEINDEL, HYBRID JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE 
COURTS OF CAMBODIA (2014). 
14. See Stromseth, Justice on the Ground, supra note 4, at 96. 
15. See, e.g., United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Promotion of 
ECCC Legacy, OHCHR - CAMBODIA (2015), http://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/rule-of-law/
promotion-eccc-legacy [https://perma.cc/9T4B-HJLB] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018); JENNY 
HOLLIGAN & MAHDEV MOHAN, ECCC’S LEGACY FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN CAMBODIA 
(Oeung Jeudy, Billy Chia-lung Tai & Sang Sothun eds., 2013); OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA & 
JOHANNA HERMAN, HYBRID TRIBUNALS AND THE RULE OF LAW: NOTES FROM BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA AND CAMBODIA 15-27 (2010); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, supra note 12; CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13, at 251–60; OPEN SOC’Y 
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION: THE IMPACT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 17–18 (2016) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND 
PERCEPTION]. 
16. See Coughlan, Ghouse & Smith, supra note 3, at 16; Lucy West, Rule of law in 
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This analysis demonstrates both the complexity and uncertainty 
of the relationship between ICL prosecutions and the rule of law 
domestically in post-atrocity states such as Cambodia. In terms of 
complexity, various rule of law-related interests, such as consistency in 
application of the law, promoting judicial independence, and resisting 
political interference, may be at play simultaneously, interacting 
dynamically and potentially clashing with one another. In terms of 
uncertainty, the ECCC experience also demonstrates that ICL 
institutions may produce both positive and negative domestic rule of 
law outcomes in post-atrocity states, making their net effect on the rule 
of law far from certain. In the specific context of Cambodia and the 
ECCC, this Article argues that there exists a real possibility that the 
Court, at least in the near term, may do little to improve the rule of law 
in Cambodia and may even have a net negative effect in this regard. 
This potential outcome helps elucidate the reality that the pursuit 
of ICL accountability in the wake of atrocity may not necessarily help 
build the rule of law in all post-atrocity states. Rather, the pursuit of 
such accountability may only bear rule of law benefits where a 
preexisting baseline commitment to the rule of law already exists. 
Conversely, in states such as Cambodia, where key actors–especially 
those in government–are hostile to the basic requirements of the rule of 
law, engaging local actors in ICL prosecutions may merely allow those 
in power to continue eroding the rule of law while more artfully 
obscuring such erosion behind façades of legality. Consequently, ICL 
may do the least in terms of domestic rule of law reform in post-atrocity 
states that are most seriously in need of such reform. 
To make out this argument, this Article proceeds in three parts. 
Part I discusses how domestic rule of law improvement has been 
incorporated as part of the mission of international criminal justice and 
how the rule of law itself is conceptualized in this regard as a set of 
procedural requirements infused with a thin bundle of human rights-
based substantive commitments. Part II provides an overview of the 
contemporary rule of law situation in Cambodia, describing how the 
 
Cambodia – reflections from the field, GRIFFITH ASIA INSIGHTS (2016), 
https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/rule-of-law-in-cambodia/ [https://perma.cc/Z72S-
8KLT]; Christoph Sperfeldt, Cambodia’s Unruly Rule of Law, EAST ASIA F. (2016), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/19/cambodias-unruly-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/
72WP-KVKK] (last visited Oct 4, 2018); Peter J. Hammer, Why Has the Rule of Law Languished 
in Cambodia?, ASIA DIALOGUE (2017), http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/08/10/why-has-the-
rule-of-law-languished-in-cambodia/ [https://perma.cc/ECT7-JC43]; LAUREN MOONEY & 
LANA BAYDAS, CAMBODIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE  9 (2018). 
8 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
ruling Cambodian People’s Party (“CPP”) and a small group of elites 
increasingly exercise power through law in ways that deeply 
compromise the rule of law. Part III provides an overview of the ECCC 
and the ongoing controversy concerning how many individuals will be 
tried at the Court, followed by an analysis of the rule of law 
implications of this controversy. Part III argues that, in its treatment of 
the Court’s controversial third and fourth cases, the ECCC is at risk of 
participating in processes similar to those through which the rule of law 
is subverted domestically in Cambodia. That is, through the deeply 
politicized, selective, and inconsistent interpretation of vague legal 
provisions; in this case, somewhat vague quasi-jurisdictional language 
appearing in the Court’s constitutive legal instrument. In engaging in 
such processes, the ECCC risks implicating itself in the ongoing 
subversion of the rule of law in Cambodia in two ways. First, by risking 
being perceived as engaging in inconsistent, politically motivated 
interpretation of relevant laws, the ECCC may unwittingly be lending 
tacit international legitimization to similar processes through which the 
rule of law is subverted domestically in Cambodia. Second, in terms of 
skills training and legal capacity building, the Court may not be 
improving the rule of law by improving the technical capabilities of, 
and setting examples for, Cambodian legal professionals. To the 
contrary, in actuality the Court may be simply training such actors to 
more artfully undermine the rule of law in Cambodia by teaching them 
how to construct more convincing façades of legality which can be used 
to provide cover for the further erosion of the rule of law. 
II. IMPROVING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-ATROCITY STATES 
AS PART OF THE MISSION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
Just what the point of international criminal justice is remains 
unclear and subject to considerable contestation.17 The same can be 
 
17. For discussion on the myriad of purposes ascribed to international criminal justice, see 
Mirjan Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 
329 (2008). This lack of clarity in terms of goals is exacerbated by the fact that the normative 
foundations of ICL itself remain contested and unclear, evidenced by the ongoing proliferation 
of proposed normative and descriptive theories of both ICL generally, and its constituent 
subparts, such as genocide and crimes against humanity. See Sarah Nouwen, International 
Criminal Law: Theory All Over the Place, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 738–61 (Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann, & Martin Clark eds., 2016) 
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said for the rule of law, which remains a perpetually contested concept 
subject to a wide variety of competing definitions.18 Despite this 
continuing contestation, international criminal justice advocates and 
international criminal justice institutions themselves regularly promote 
ICL accountability as contributing to a wide variety of desirable 
outcomes, including serving as catalyst for improving the rule of law 
domestically in post-atrocity states.19 This notion–that ICL 
prosecutions will both achieve a measure of justice and help improve 
the rule of law in post-atrocity states–is especially resonant given that 
the commission of atrocities themselves tends to be associated with 
fundamental breakdowns in the rule of law.20 This view bolsters ICL’s 
atrocity prevention claims, as the maintenance of a robust rule of law 
is widely considered to be a bulwark against the commission (or 
recurrence) of atrocities.21 Against this backdrop, the idea that ICL 
accountability may improve the rule of law in post-atrocity states 
undoubtedly helps to justify the immense expenditures associated with 
ICL prosecutions. This is especially true for so-called “hybrid” 
international criminal justice institutions such as the ECCC, which 
combine local and international staff, and operate on-site in post-
atrocity states.22 
 
(providing an overview of the multitude of varying theories of ICL). For examples of such 
theories, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist 
Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 273 (2005); Ohlin, supra note 
3; ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PUNISHMENT (2010); Larry May, A Hobbesian Defense of International Criminal Law, 14 INT’L 
CRIM. L. REV. 768 (2014); LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE 
ACCOUNT (2005); Robert Dubler, What’s in a Name? A Theory of Crimes against Humanity, 15 
AUST. INT’L L.J. 85 (2008); David Luban, A Theory of Crimes against Humanity, 29 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 85 (2004). 
18. See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 3 at 110; MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 83–114. 
19. See, e.g., PROMOTION OF ECCC LEGACY, supra note 15; Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, supra note 12. On the general relationship between ICL and the rule of 
law, see, BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 52–54 (2003); Stromseth, Pursuing 
Accountability, supra note 3, at 252; Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit 
of International Justice, 24 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 191–211, 196–98 (2010). 
20. See MCAULIFFE, supra note 2; Ohlin, supra note 3, at 100–01. 
21. See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE ET AL., PREVENTING ATROCITIES: FIVE KEY PRIMERS 29–
44 (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/preventing-atrocities-five-key-
primers [https://perma.cc/LPT5-A4ZZ]. 
22. See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003). 
Advocates of international criminal justice meanwhile often sidestep the longstanding peace 
versus justice debate by adopting the mantra that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without 
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A. The Rule of Law as a Set of Procedural Requirements Infused with 
Minimal Human Rights Substantive Values 
Although the rule of law remains a deeply contested concept 
generally, within mainstream transitional and international criminal 
justice discourses, the rule of law tends to be associated with a mix of 
basic procedural and substantive commitments grounded in human 
rights norms. Procedurally, the rule of law is associated with adherence 
to a set of basic requirements in terms of how laws are passed and 
enforced. Substantively, the rule of law tends to be associated with 
commitments to representative governance and the protection of basic 
human rights by an independent judiciary.23 For example, the United 
Nations’ “International Law and Justice” webpage states that the rule 
of law, defined as “[t]he principle that everyone–from the individual to 
the State itself–is accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, is a fundamental 
concept which drives much of the [United Nations’] work.”24 Writing 
on the relationship between international criminal justice and the rule 
of law, Ilias Bantekas argues that “[m]ore than anything else, the rule 
of law entails the application of a minimum set of human rights rules 
 
justice. In this context, the term “justice” tends to be deployed as a means of referring 
specifically to ICL prosecutions. In this vein, Neha Jain observes, “[p]ro-prosecution advocates 
assert that it is only through justice-establishing accountability for abuses, creating an accurate 
historical record, and providing some relief for victims-that a conflict society can transition to a 
peaceful and stable one based on the rule of law.” Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis 
Prosecution and Reconciliation: The Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International 
Criminal Justice, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 247, 266 (2010) (emphasis added) (citing 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 602 (2007)); José E. Alvarez, 
Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 (1998); 
TEITEL, supra note 2; Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 7 (A. James MacAdams ed., 1997). 
For an example of the common tendency to conflate the broad concept of “international justice” 
with the much more specific pursuit of international criminal justice, see International Justice, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice [https://perma.cc/GGZ2-
7PPS] (defining “international justice” as “accountability for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity”). 
23. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice and the Rule 
of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 345 (2001) [hereinafter Dyzenhaus, Judicial Independence]; 
MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 83–93. 
24. International Law and Justice, UNITED NATIONS (2016), http://www.un.org/en/
sections/issues-depth/international-law-and-justice/index.html [https://perma.cc/RNR2-EH69] 
(last visited June 21, 2018). 
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to which the public authorities must religiously adhere to.”25 This 
general conceptualization of the rule of law is exemplified by a widely 
cited 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies, wherein the UN Secretary-General defines 
the rule of law as: 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, 
as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the 
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.26 
These articulations of the rule of law combine basic procedural 
requirements (e.g., public promulgation and legal certainty) with a 
baseline of substantive commitments to basic human rights principles 
(e.g., equality and fairness). Procedurally, the model proposed by the 
Secretary-General closely resembles Lon Fuller’s well-known 
articulation of the rule of law,27 though adding to it a layer of 
substantive commitments grounded in human rights norms.28 
According to Fuller, the internal or procedural “morality” of legality 
requires that all law substantially conform to eight criteria of legality: 
1. generality; 
2. promulgation; 
 
25. Ilias Bantekas, The Rule of Law Through International Criminal Justice Mechanisms, 
1 L. & JUST. REV. 49 (2010). 
26. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter The Rule of Law 
(2004)]. An update to the report was released in 2011. See U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/2004/616 (Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter The Rule of Law (2011)]. 
27. It should be noted that although Fuller’s work is central to rule of law scholarship, 
Fuller himself never used the phrase “rule of law,” instead referring to the “inner morality” of 
law. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969). For a discussion of this 
semantic difference, see David Luban, The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining 
Fuller’s Canons, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 2-4 (2010) [hereinafter Luban, The Rule of Law and 
Human Dignity]. 
28. The Rule of Law (2004), supra note 26; The Rule of Law (2011), supra note 26. 
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3. non-retroactivity; 
4. clarity; 
5. non-contradiction; 
6. not requiring the impossible; 
7. constancy; and 
8. congruence between the law and official action.29 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope helpfully summarize these 
requirements as requiring that laws be: 
general, prohibiting, requiring, or permitting certain conduct. They 
must also be promulgated, and therefore accessible to the public, 
enabling actors to know what the law requires. Law should not be 
retroactive, but prospective, enabling citizens to take the law into 
account in their decision making. Actors must also be able to 
understand what is permitted, prohibited, or required by law–the 
law must be clear. Law should avoid contradiction, not requiring 
or permitting and prohibiting at the same time. Law must be 
realistic and not demand the impossible. Its demands on citizens 
must remain relatively constant. Finally, there should be 
congruence between legal norms and the actions of officials 
operating under the law.30 
These requirements can be used to assess the legal legitimacy of not 
only individual norms or rules, but also entire legal regimes, or sub-
parts thereof.31 
Brunnée and Toope’s summary of Fuller’s legality criteria help 
elucidate the centrality of Fuller’s work to how the rule of law tends to 
be conceptualized by actors in the fields of transitional justice and ICL. 
Fuller’s legality criteria, while for the most part procedural in nature, 
in that they dictate the processes through which laws must be created 
and applied, nonetheless contain minimal substantive normative 
commitments to equality before the law and fairness, in terms of 
generality of application.32 Fuller justifies these thin substantive 
 
29. See generally FULLER, supra note 27. 
30. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law: An Introduction, 
3 INT’L THEORY 307, 310 (2011) (citing Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of 
the Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHIL. 239, 240-41 (2005)). 
31. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 26 (2010) (noting that Fuller’s legality 
criteria “apply to both individual rules and systems of rule-making”). 
32. These thin normative commitments are evident in Fuller’s requirements of generality, 
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commitments by arguing that they are inherent in the form of law itself 
as it is broadly understood by those subject to legal regimes.33 He 
makes this argument by presenting hypothetical situations wherein 
purported laws wholly fail to conform to his legality criteria, by being 
for example, secret and hence inscrutable to the public, or in a constant 
state of flux, so no member of the public can determine the state of the 
law applicable to them with any certainty at a specific moment in 
time.34 
According to Fuller’s approach, determining whether a specific 
rule can be accurately labelled “law” or an entire legal system adheres 
to the basic requirements of the rule of law, is an assessment of degree, 
rather than simple binary one.35 Thus, the dividing line between both a 
single rule being properly labelled “law” and an entire legal system 
being properly described as adhering to the rule of law is a decidedly 
inexact, fuzzy one.36 Indeed, Fuller himself notes that absolute 
adherence to all eight criteria of legality remains functionally 
impossible, observing that “[a]t the height of the ascent we are tempted 
to imagine a utopia of legality in which all rules are perfectly clear, 
consistent with one another, known to every citizen, and never 
retroactive. In this utopia, the rules remain constant through time, 
demand only what is possible and are scrupulously observed by courts, 
police, and everyone else charged with their administration.”37 Of 
course, while wide gradations of conformance to this ideal exist and 
may be difficult to parse, at the poles, it may be quite clear when the 
basic requirements of the rule of law are scrupulously adhered to or 
fundamentally lacking. 
For example, Fuller, in his famous exchange with H.L.A. Hart, 
argued that various laws passed by the Nazi regime in Germany, which 
were of course, extremely unequal in a substantive sense, also violated 
 
non-contradiction, and congruence between the law and official action. Unless lawmakers are 
willing to formally differentiate between different categories of individuals and treat one group 
as legally inferior to the other, it is difficult to imagine a legal system substantially complying 
with these legality criteria that has no commitments to legal equality whatsoever. 
33. FULLER, supra note 27, at 104. 
34. Id. at 33–94. 
35. Id. at 41. Fuller describes this as the reality that laws and legal systems can, and do, 
“half exist.” Id. at 122. 
36. Id. at 122. 
37. Id. at 41. 
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many of Fuller’s criteria of legality.38 Such “laws” were often 
retroactive, enacted secretly, not clear or possible to follow by those 
subject to them, contradicted other German laws still in force, and were 
themselves regularly brushed aside in the name of expediency and 
convenience.39 Thus, in Fuller’s view, such Nazi edicts were not “law” 
in any true sense of the word, as they flagrantly violated the legality 
requirements of generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, being 
possible to follow, non-contradiction and congruence between the law 
and official action, and were hence, an example of raw power 
masquerading as law.40 
While the debate between those in favor of a Fullerian conception 
of the rule of law and those with alternative views–especially strict 
legal positivists–is unlikely to be settled in the foreseeable future, the 
dominant basic conception of the rule of law underlying the fields of 
human rights, transitional justice and ICL, as exemplified in the UN 
Secretary-General’s 2004 report, largely mirror Fuller’s view of the 
rule of law as a set of largely procedural requirements inherently 
infused with minimal substantive commitments to basic formal 
equality. For example, the requirements of general applicability, public 
promulgation, equality before the law, evenhanded enforcement, legal 
certainty, and avoidance of arbitrariness referenced by the UN 
Secretary-General closely resemble Fuller’s criteria of generality, 
promulgation, clarity, non-contradiction, and congruence between the 
law and official action.41 These models of legality tend towards a basic 
substantive commitment to equality. Law can hardly abide by Fuller’s 
requirements of generality, clarity, being possible to follow and being 
generally obeyed in practice (i.e. “congruent” with official action), 
 
38. Fuller, supra note 3, at 650. 
39. Id. at 650–55. David Dyzenhaus similarly demonstrates how attempts to legalize 
Apartheid in South Africa inevitably violated basic rule of law requirements. See David 
Dyzenhaus, Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of Justification, 17 
REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 2-11 (2012) [hereinafter Dyzenhause, Dignity in Administrative Law]. 
Elsewhere, Dyzenhaus argues that the notion of “law” within the contemporary rule of law 
movement “connotes both the positive legal regime created by a formally valid statute and the 
principles of legality associated with the rule of law.” David Dyzenhaus, Preventive Justice and 
the Rule-of-Law Project, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91, 91-114 
(Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013) [hereinafter Dyzenhause, 
Preventative Justice]. 
40. Fuller, supra note 3, at 632-57. 
41. Rule of Law (2004), supra note 26; cf. FULLER, supra note 27. 
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without at least some minimal commitment to treating those subject to 
the law equally in a substantive sense.42 
It is this basic model of the rule of law, as a sliding scale made up 
of largely procedural requirements infused with important, but 
minimal, substantive commitments to equality,43 that this Article uses 
as a framework assessing the rule of law situation in Cambodia and its 
relationship to the work of the ECCC.44 This framework is useful for 
two main reasons. First, as intimated above, in a rough sense, it is this 
basic understanding of the rule of law that international criminal justice 
advocates and institutions tend to refer to, implicitly or explicitly, when 
arguing that ICL prosecutions can improve the rule of law in post-
atrocity states.45 Second, Cambodia itself has, in its Constitution and 
 
42. That is, unless lawmakers are willing to create formal legal distinctions between 
different classes of citizens and explicitly state that one class of citizens is not entitled to equal 
protection of the law. Only the most persecutory regimes are willing to engage in such 
distinctions. For example, even in the Jim Crow South in the United States and Apartheid-era 
South Africa, the legal fiction of formal equality under the law was maintained through “separate 
but equal” doctrines, despite explicit legal segregation. David Dyzenhaus demonstrates how 
attempts to maintain such “separate but equal” legal fictions inherently undermine the rule of 
law, arguing that “there is a core of equality-the specifically legal status of equal dignity-to the 
public law order of any law-governed state.” Dyzenhaus, Preventive Justice, supra note 39, at 
112. For Dyzenhaus, this argument is true of all societies, be they categorized as “transitional” 
or not. See Dyzenhaus, Judicial Independence, supra note 23. 
43. For an analysis of Fuller’s work on the rule of law in this vein, see Luban, The Rule of 
Law and Human Dignity, supra note 27. 
44. Of course, Cambodia may not be a “transitional” country in that it is not undergoing a 
meaningful shift away from conflict and authoritarianism and towards a renewed state 
commitment to the rule of law and democratization. Rather, Cambodia has undergone a series 
of largely authoritarian transitions following the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. 
For example, Alexander Hinton argues that Cambodia has undergone at least three distinct 
“transitions” since 1979, none of which fit into the classical mode envisioned within the 
transitional justice imaginary. See HINTON, JUSTICE FACADE, supra note 12, at 37–63. 
Moreover, the trials conducted by the ECCC relate to events occurring over four decades ago, 
rather than more recent atrocities. While this presents additional difficulties to the improvement 
of the rule of law in Cambodia through the ECCC experience, given the extremely weak rule of 
law situation in Cambodia presently and how such lack affects the daily lives of Cambodians, 
along with the fact that the ECCC and its backers have repeatedly touted the Court’s ability to 
improve the rule of law in Cambodia, an evaluation of this relationship remains important to 
understanding the assumptions embedded in the notion that the pursuit of ICL accountability 
has a wholly positive and linear relationship with the domestic rule of law in post-atrocity states. 
45. Often, the rule of law domestically and the concept of global governance through an 
international rule of law are conflated within transitional justice and ICL discourses. While the 
two concepts are undoubtedly related, they remain distinct in important ways. On the “branding” 
of ICL’s rule of law credentials, the oft-conflation between the rule of law domestically and 
internationally, and the notion that the international rule of law can be a “solution to the lack of 
a domestic rule of law,” see Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Rule of Law as a Marketing Tool: 
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by signing on to eight core international human rights treaties, at least 
nominally committed itself to democratic rule of law-based governance 
in this basic mold.46 
As will become clear, however, Cambodia’s commitment to such 
rule of law-based governance is increasingly paid mere lip-service by 
the dominant CPP, which regularly brushes aside, changes, or simply 
ignores altogether laws it finds inconvenient in an unpredictable and ad 
hoc manner.47 The ECCC’s failure to meaningfully insert itself in a 
positive manner into domestic practices related to the rule of law 
suggests that, at least in the near-term, ICL prosecutions may only serve 
to bolster the rule of law in post-atrocity states already fundamentally 
committed, politically and socially, to improving the rule of law. Thus, 
in situations such as that in Cambodia, wherein the rule of law is most 
glaringly lacking and relevant political actors are actively hostile to the 
rule of law, international criminal justice institutions may be unable to 
translate their work into positive developments for the rule of law at 
the domestic level. Moreover, as exemplified by the ECCC experience 
in Cambodia, if such institutions are actually committed to improving 
the rule of law, such commitment may conflict with other goals, such 
as obtaining local cooperation or securing final judgments. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF LAW DEFICIT IN 
CONTEMPORARY CAMBODIA 
According to virtually any mainstream conception of it, including 
the one sketched out in the preceding section, the rule of law is 
something Cambodia glaringly lacks. In its most recent global rule of 
law index, the World Justice Project ranked Cambodia second to last 
 
The International Criminal Court and the Brand of Global Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE RULE OF LAW (Christopher May & Adam Winchester eds., 2018). 
46. For an overview of Cambodia's human rights treaty commitments, see Fact Sheet: 
Applicability of International Human Rights Law in Cambodia (2014), CAMBODIAN CTR. FOR 
HUM. RTS., https://cchrcambodia.org/admin/media/factsheet/factsheet/english/2014_01_09_
CCHR_Fact_sheet_Applicability_of_international_law_in_Cambodia_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TCH-3RCB] (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
This is not to suggest that Cambodia is an outlier in terms of the government’s wholly 
nominal commitment to protecting human rights. Numerous countries are rife with 
contradictions concerning the gulf between rhetoric and actual practice when it comes to human 
rights protections. The United States is a prime example of such contradictory practices, as it 
presents itself as global leader in promoting equality and human rights despite itself contributing 
to numerous human rights violations, both abroad and domestically. 
47. See, e.g., Coughlan, Ghouse & Smith, supra note 3, at 20–31. 
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(112th) out of the 113 countries assessed, with only Venezuela ranking 
lower.48 This incredibly low ranking is attributable to a combination of 
factors. The Cambodian judicial system is underfunded, largely 
subservient to the CPP, and deeply embedded within the entrenched 
patronage networks that have long structured Cambodian society.49 
Justice sector officials, including judges, routinely pay bribes to obtain 
their positions, and bribery is a routine component of litigation.50 
Enforcement of the law is also highly selective and contingent on one’s 
social status and connections.51 Consequently, while Cambodia’s 
justice system is harshly wielded against activists and political 
opponents of the CPP,52 impunity, even for serious, well-documented 
crimes or regulatory infractions, remains the norm for high-ranking 
CPP members and other social elites.53 
A. Historical Context: Atrocity, Conflict and Foreign Intervention 
It is important to understand not only how Cambodia’s rule of law 
deficit currently manifests itself, but also the root causes of this deficit 
and the processes through which the rule of law is undermined in order 
 
48. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 21 (2016). This is not to suggest that 
the World Justice Project’s assessment criteria and process are not without deep structural flaws, 
but is meant solely as a rough indicator of the undeniably weak rule of law situation in 
contemporary Cambodia. 
49. Patron-client relationships have long played a major role in structuring Cambodian 
society. For general discussions of the roles patronage networks have historically played in 
structuring Cambodian society, see DAVID P. CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 104–05 
(2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA]. For an analysis of the role 
such patronage networks played in the Khmer Rouge regime, see ALEXANDER LABAN HINTON, 
WHY DID THEY KILL? CAMBODIA IN THE SHADOW OF GENOCIDE 96–170 (2005) [hereinafter 
HINTON, WHY DID THEY KILL?]. For discussions of how patronage networks shape the rule of 
law in contemporary Cambodia, see Stephen McCarthy & Kheang Un, The Evolution of Rule of 
Law in Cambodia, 24 DEMOCRATIZATION 100–18 (2017); Coughlan, Ghouse, & Smith, supra 
note 3 at 17–21. 
50. See McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 111. 
51. See, e.g., id. at 112. 
52. See id. at 105–09; see also MOONEY & BAYDAS, supra note 16, at 9; Siena Anstis, 
Using Law to Impair the Rights and Freedoms of Human Rights Defenders: A Case Study of 
Cambodia, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 312 (2012). 
53. For an example of such impunity and how it is perpetuated by the Cambodian legal 
system, see MCCARTHY & UN, supra note 49, at 112; see also Brad Adams, “Tell Them That I 
Want to Kill Them”: Two Decades of Impunity in Hun Sen’s Cambodia, HUM. RTS WATCH 
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/13/tell-them-i-want-kill-them/two-
decades-impunity-hun-sens-cambodia [https://perma.cc/A4JE-V7M6] (last visited Sept. 24, 
2018). 
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to meaningfully assess the ECCC’s relationship to domestic rule of law 
reform efforts. This is especially important in the Cambodian context, 
where the origins of the country’s current rule of law shortcomings can 
be traced back to Cambodia’s long history of colonial domination, 
foreign intervention, civil war and atrocity, and its ongoing, uncertain 
struggle to achieve democratic governance. Without at least a basic 
understanding of this history, one cannot fully appreciate how and why 
Cambodia suffers from such an acute rule of law deficit despite decades 
of legal reform efforts. 
Cambodia has never enjoyed a period of sustained peace, stability, 
and governance in accordance with anything resembling a human 
rights-respecting rule of law regime. After generations of decreasing 
regional power and influence following the decline of the Angkorian 
Empire, Cambodia was colonized by the French from 1863 to 1953.54 
While the French established a basic civil law system in Cambodia, 
many aspects of which survive to this day, this system was far from the 
kind of human rights-based rule of law regime envisioned by most 
transitional justice advocates and described by the UN Secretary-
General in his 2004 report.55 The overriding objective of the French 
colonial administration was to extract Cambodia’s resources and 
wealth through taxation and natural resource extraction and thus, little 
attention was paid to establishing anything resembling a functioning 
nationwide legal system, save for enforcing tax collection.56 
Cambodia’s independence, negotiated by King Norodom 
Sihanouk in 1953, brought with it the drafting of a new constitution and 
the promise of other legal reforms.57 However, before the country was 
able to construct and stabilize a working justice system, Cambodia was 
drawn into the Vietnam War, despite its policy of neutrality.58 
Sihanouk, who had become Prime Minister after negotiating 
Cambodia’s independence and abdicating the throne, was deposed in a 
 
54. For an overview of this period, see CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA, supra note 
49, at 137–90. 
55. MCCARTHY & UN, supra note 49, at 103. 
56. See CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA, supra note 49, at 137–90. Moreover, 
French colonial administrators were themselves, virtually exempt from the law. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. DAVID P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLITICS, WAR AND 
REVOLUTION SINCE 1945 85–196 (1991) [hereinafter CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF 
CAMBODIAN HISTORY]. 
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1970 coup led by one of his generals, Lon Nol.59 This ushered in a 
brutal five-year civil war.60 This war, and the United States’ often 
haphazard aerial bombardment of Cambodia’s countryside in support 
of the Lon Nol regime, killed many thousands of civilians and 
devastated Cambodia’s already limited infrastructure.61 
The civil war ended on April 17, 1975, when the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea, popularly known as the Khmer Rouge, seized power 
following the abrupt pullout of the United States.62 The Khmer Rouge 
immediately set about radically reorganizing Cambodian society, in the 
process engaging in stifling oppression and repeated waves of violent 
purges.63 Amidst the chaos and killing of the Khmer Rouge’s reign, 
Cambodia’s legal infrastructure was decimated. Virtually all Khmer-
language legal texts were destroyed and nearly all Cambodian legal 
professionals were killed, either directly by execution, or indirectly 
through overwork and starvation.64 
The Khmer Rouge were eventually ousted from power by the 
Vietnamese military in January 1979.65 The rule of law void left behind 
by the devastation of the 1970s was not, however, systematically 
addressed in the immediate post-Khmer Rouge period. The 
Vietnamese-installed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (“PRK”) 
government put very little effort into the creation of a functioning legal 
system, as the government was modeled on a Soviet-style system 
wherein courts perform a limited function, operating solely as an arm 
 
59. See id. at 197–210. 
60. Id. at 206–35. 
61. On the civil war generally, see id. at 1–30; BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: 
RACE, POWER, AND GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79 1–30 (3d 
ed. 2008). On the US bombing campaign, see Taylor Owen & Ben Kiernan, Bombs over 
Cambodia, THE WALRUS, 2006, at 62–69. 
62. See CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA, supra note 49, at 206–08. 
63. For overviews of Khmer Rouge policies and purges, see generally CHANDLER, THE 
TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 236–72; KIERNAN, supra note 61; 
HINTON, WHY DID THEY KILL?, supra note 49. 
64. For an example of the Khmer Rouge regime generally, including living conditions, 
mass executions and the targeting of former city dwellers and intellectuals, see  ELIZABETH 
BECKER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER ROUGE REVOLUTION 
(1998); KIERNAN, supra note 61; KHAMBOLY DY, A HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 
1975 -1979 (2007); McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 103–04. According to one estimate, only 
ten qualified Cambodian lawyers survived the Khmer Rouge regime. See Coughlan, supra note 
3, at 16 (citing AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA: URGENT NEED FOR 
JUDICIAL REFORM (2002)). 
65. See CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY, supra note 58, at 1–2. 
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of the government’s power.66 Cambodia was also far from stable at the 
time, as the country suffered periodic bouts of armed conflict between 
the government and the remnants of the Khmer Rouge.67 
Achieving peace and a semblance of stability in Cambodia proved 
a difficult and long process. The remnants of the Khmer Rouge 
continued to conduct guerrilla warfare and were not fully demobilized 
until 1996. Eventually, the PRK government, led by Hun Sen, a former 
Khmer Rouge military cadre who had defected to Vietnam in 1977 and 
was installed by the Vietnamese as Prime Minister of Cambodia in 
1985,68 negotiated a provisional peace deal in 1991, known as the Paris 
Peace Accords (“the Accords”).69 From 1992 to 1993, pursuant to the 
Accords, the United Nations took responsibility for governing 
Cambodia, setting up the United Nations Transitional Authority for 
Cambodia (“UNTAC”) to facilitate Cambodia’s first post-Khmer 
Rouge democratic elections in 1993.70 These hotly contested elections 
were narrowly, but definitively, won by the royalist National United 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(“FUNCINPEC”)71 party led by Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh. The recently formed CPP, led by Hun Sen, came in second, 
however, Hun Sen and the CPP refused to accept the result. Eventually 
a compromise was struck whereby a coalition FUNCINPEC-CPP 
government was formed, with Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen as co-
Prime Ministers.72 Shortly after this coalition was formed, Hun Sen and 
the CPP consolidated power over Cambodia, in what many observers 
describe as a coup, by progressively ousting Ranariddh and the 
FUNCINPEC from power, at times violently.73 Since 1997, the CPP 
have maintained a majority government in Cambodia with Hun Sen as 
Prime Minister. Although Cambodia has had regular elections, the CPP 
 
66. See McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 104; see also MOONEY & BAYDAS, supra note 
16 at 9. 
67.  For an overview of this history, see generally JOEL BRINKLEY, CAMBODIA’S CURSE: 
THE MODERN HISTORY OF A TROUBLED LAND 53–154 (2012). 
68. Adams, supra note 53, at 4–11. 
69. BRINKLEY, supra note 67, at 67–68. 
70. Id. at 69–85; Adams, supra note 53, at 11. 
71. The “National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative 
Cambodia.” The acronym FUNCINPEC is from the French version of this title. See SEBASTIAN 
STRANGIO, HUN SEN’S CAMBODIA 36 (2014). 
72. BRINKLEY, supra note 67, at 79–85. 
73. For an overview of these violent tactics as documented by UNTAC, including the 
1997-1998 CPP coup, see id. at 123-131; Adams, supra note 53, at 11–32. 
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has maintained power through a mix of populism, the power of 
incumbency, the persecution of political opponents, and occasional acts 
of violence aimed at stifling dissent.74 
As Cambodia stabilized during the 1990s and early 2000s, formal 
legal reforms were conducted and foreign aid money, much of it aimed 
at improving the rule of law, flooded into Cambodia.75 Many such 
reforms seemed to indicate that post-atrocity Cambodia would 
eventually achieve a reasonable degree of adherence to the rule of law. 
This promise, however, has thus far remained unfulfilled. While the 
CPP era has been considerably more stable than Cambodia’s previous 
periods of foreign domination, upheaval, and atrocity, little progress 
has been made in terms of constructing a functioning rule of law in 
Cambodia. 
B. The Rule of Law Façade in Contemporary Cambodia 
Nominally, contemporary Cambodia maintains a firm 
commitment to the construction of a democratic, rule of law-based 
society. This commitment is evident in various provisions of the 
current Cambodian Constitution, which states that Cambodia shall be 
organized as a “system of a liberal multi-party democracy, to guarantee 
human rights, [and] to ensure the respect of law.”76 The Constitution 
also provides for various formal components commonly associated 
with the rule of law, including an independent judiciary tasked with 
protecting the “rights and freedoms” of Cambodian citizens, a multi-
tiered court system providing for appellate review, and the creation of 
a Constitutional Council, tasked with ensuring “the constitutionality of 
laws, rules, and regulations through review and veto powers.”77 The 
Constitution also explicitly recognizes the legal status of human rights, 
states that all Cambodian citizens are “equal before the law,”78 and 
 
74. BRINKLEY, supra note 67, at 133–346. 
75. See, e.g., EK CHANBORETH & SOK HACH, AID EFFECTIVENESS IN CAMBODIA 1 (2008) 
(estimating that from 1998 to 20018, “total development assistance to Cambodia amounted to 
about US$5.5 billion”). 
76. រដ្ឋធម្មនញ្ុញៃន្រពះ���ចក្រកម� �  [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM 
OF CAMBODIA] Sept. 21, 1993, preamble. 
77. McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 104. Article 51 of the Constitution explicitly 
provides for liberal, democratic governance and the separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF 
CAMBODIA, supra note 76, art. 51. 
78. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, supra note 76, art. 31. 
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enshrines key democratic rights, such as those to free speech, to 
peacefully demonstrate, to vote, and to form political parties and 
associations.79 
Despite these nominal commitments, the promise of the early 
1990s that the rule of law in Cambodia would improve in a progressive, 
linear fashion has proven largely illusory. As the CPP has entrenched 
itself in power, Cambodia has not progressed towards becoming the 
kind of liberal, rule of law nation envisaged in its Constitution. Instead, 
Cambodia has become essentially a one-party state within which the 
dominant CPP wields the law as it sees fit.80 As Stephen McCarthy and 
Kheang Un observe, the CPP appears to be emulating the “Beijing 
Consensus” model of the rule of law, according to which the rule of 
law itself is conceived of as “narrow, proceduralist,” “divorced from 
democracy promotion,” and focused on facilitating top-down economic 
and social control.81 According to this model, of which Singapore’s 
legal system is a prime example, the role of law is not to protect the 
rights of individual citizens, but to maintain “an ordered society 
wherein human rights are subordinated to political stability and 
economic growth.”82 
While the rhetoric emanating from the CPP at times suggests that 
the government is shifting away from outwardly claiming to support of 
human rights and a human rights-based rule of law, the CPP more often 
claims to be operating within the law, even when abundant evidence 
suggests it is not.83 Thus, while there may be differing conceptions of 
the rule of law amongst Cambodian and international actors, including 
within the ECCC, the CPP is, at the very least, committed to 
maintaining the appearance of conforming to the basic rule of law 
requirements outlined in the Cambodian Constitution. 
If one views the rule of law through the CPP’s thin, formalist 
approach emphasizing stability and order over individual rights and 
 
79. Id. arts. 31-50. 
80. See infra at 22-30. 
81. McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 102. 
82. Id. at 103. 
83. For example, after sweeping electoral victories following the CPP-led dissolution of 
Cambodia’s main opposition parties, CPP spokesman Sok Esyan touted the efficiency benefits 
of one-party states, such as China, stating that “having one party dominate both houses of 
parliament would get rid of any legislative obstacles.” Pang Vichea, CPP Spokesman Touts One-
Party Rule, Points to China’s Example, PHNOM PENH POST (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/cpp-spokesman-touts-one-party-rule-
points-chinas-example [https://perma.cc/T7UT-AUQV]. 
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freedoms, democratic governance, and equality, the otherwise strange 
juxtaposition of Cambodia’s recent proliferation of new laws amidst an 
ongoing erosion of the rule of law begins to make sense. The CPP has 
artfully trod a fine line between placating donor countries concerned 
with Cambodia’s worrying human rights record and glaring rule of law 
deficit, and its desire to create additional levers through which it may 
exert social control. Nominal legal reform projects have provided an 
opportunity for the CPP to leverage its control over lawmaking 
processes and the judiciary to create various legal mechanisms through 
which the government can exert power, especially to weaken political 
opponents and silence critics, often while simultaneously claiming to 
be strengthening the rule of law.84 In recent years, the CPP has 
increasingly exercised power through such ostensibly legal means, 
utilizing both the promulgation of new, oft-vague laws and the selective 
interpretation and enforcement of existing laws. 
The CPP’s utilization of Cambodia’s criminal justice system to 
serve its interests exemplifies the government’s use of law as an 
instrument of projecting its power. As the ECCC is at its core, a 
criminal justice institution, the criminal justice sector is the area for 
which claims of the Court’s ability to improve the rule of law gain the 
most traction. If the ECCC were able to have a meaningful positive 
effect on criminal justice reform in Cambodia, it would be a major 
contribution to improving the rule of law in the country more generally, 
as the administration of criminal justice is one area utterly lacking in 
terms of adherence to basic rule of law criteria in Cambodia. Despite 
the adoption of a comprehensive code of criminal law and procedure in 
2009,85 criminal laws continue to contain key areas of ambiguity, are 
enforced selectively, and are subject to unpredictable, oft contradictory 
interpretations.86 
 
84. For an overview of legal proceedings brought by the CPP against its opponents, see 
McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 105-09. 
85. Prior to the adoption of its present criminal code, Cambodia relied on a skeletal code 
of criminal law and procedure enacted in 1992 by UNTAC. See Cambodia: Criminal Law & 
Procedure of 1992 of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia), WIPO 
(1992), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp [https://perma.cc/DRT3-422W] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2018). 
86. For descriptions of some of the many rule of law shortcomings of Cambodia’s criminal 
justice sector, see generally Adams, supra note 53; PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra 
note 15. 
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While the current Cambodian Code of Criminal Law and 
Procedure (“Criminal Code”), undoubtedly improved the clarity of 
Cambodian criminal law and ostensibly confers fair trial rights on 
criminal defendants, it also retains various vaguely defined offenses, 
such as defamation and treason.87 The CPP, despite the Cambodian 
Constitution’s nominal protection of free speech rights, has a 
longstanding history of using criminal defamation laws as a means of 
attacking political opponents and dissidents.88 This political leveraging 
of defamation has continued, and perhaps even expanded, since 2009, 
enabled by vaguely worded criminal offenses and a pliant judiciary.89 
Attacks on political opponents via spurious defamation charges 
are often used in conjunction with other, non-criminal areas of the law. 
For example, Cambodia’s 2009 Law on Peaceful Assembly contains 
vague provisions conferring on government officials the authority to 
arbitrarily “approve or ban almost any peaceful protest” allowing the 
CPP to tightly control Cambodia’s supposedly free speech.90 If 
disgruntled citizens decide to protest without getting prior approval, 
they risk being charged with vague criminal offenses, such as those of 
“insulting” or “obstructing” public officials.91 In a similar vein, the 
CPP has also pushed through legislation regulating Non-Governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”) operating within Cambodia, containing vague 
registration requirements and other provisions that allow the 
government to greatly impair the ability of NGOs it finds troublesome 
to operate.92 As many of Cambodia’s civil society organizations are 
organized as NGOs,93 the law provides a convenient tool for the CPP 
to wield against potential sources of opposition. 
 
87. CRIMINAL CODE OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA [CRIMINAL CODE], arts. 305-10 
(Bunleng Cheung, trans., 2011). 
88. See McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 105. 
89. McCarthy and Un argue that such lawsuits are deployed by the CPP as “political 
weapons.” Id. 
90. See generally Anstis, supra note 52, at 320. 
91. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 87, arts. 502-05. For examples of the use of these laws to 
quell protests, see Anstis, supra note 52; Ananth Baliga & Lay Samean, Boeung Kak Activists 
Found Guilty, PHNOM PENH POST (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/
boeung-kak-activists-found-guilty [https://perma.cc/F4M2-DLBV]. 
92. Anstis, supra note 52, at 322–25; McCarthy & Un, supra note 49, at 105; Taing Vida, 
NGO Law Passes, PHNOM PENH POST (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/ngo-law-passes [https://perma.cc/W3NH-HDYD]. 
93. By organizing themselves as NGOs, civil society organizations are best positioned to 
obtain crucial international funding. Open Development Cambodia estimated that as of June 
2016 there were approximately 4,637 NGOs operating in Cambodia. Open Development 
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The CPP has repeatedly followed this strategy of pushing through 
laws creating onerous and ambiguous registration and reporting 
requirements that interact with criminal law and can be selectively 
interpreted and enforced to maintain the CPP’s political dominancy. 
Most recently, following gains by an emergent opposition party, the 
Cambodian National Rescue Party (“CNRP”) in June 2017 local 
elections,94 the CPP pushed through “urgent” amendments to 
Cambodia’s Law on Political Parties in July 2017.95 The amendments 
included both a ban on individuals convicted of criminal offenses from 
holding positions in political parties and troublingly vague language 
forbidding political parties from, inter alia, “[c]reating a secession that 
would lead to the destruction of national unity and territorial integrity 
of Cambodia”; “sabotag[ing]” Cambodia’s supposed liberal, multi-
party democracy or constitutional monarchy; “[c]arry[ing] out an 
activity that would affect the security of the state”; or “incit[ing]” to 
“break up . . . national unity.”96 The amended Law on Political Parties’ 
passage was roundly condemned by Cambodian and international civil 
society organizations, who argued that the amended law is not only bad 
law, but that the amendments violate fundamental provisions of both 
the Cambodian Constitution and Cambodia’s treaty-based human 
rights obligations.97 
At the time of its passage, the amended law was widely interpreted 
as a direct attack on the CNRP and its leader at the time, Sam Rainsy, 
Hun Sen’s longtime political opponent currently living in exile in 
France after being convicted of defamation charges.98 Disqualified by 
 
Cambodia, CIV. SOC'Y OPEN DEV. CAMBODIA (ODC) (2017), 
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95. Savi Khorn, Cambodia Signs Controversial Amendment into Law, RADIO FREE ASIA 
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96. See id.; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS & HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA, A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDED LAW ON POLITICAL 
PARTIES (2017). 
97. Khorn, supra note 95. 
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the amendments, Rainsy stepped down as leader of the CNRP and was 
replaced by his deputy, Kem Sokha, a man who himself had previously 
been accused of defamation and imprisoned in 2005 when he was the 
director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights.99 Kem Sokha was 
arrested again shortly after assuming the leadership of the CNRP, this 
time on manifestly spurious charges of treason, for having allegedly 
made anti-government remarks in a 2013 speech delivered in 
Australia.100 Despite his failing health and the vague, unsubstantiated 
nature of the charges against him, Kem Sokha was repeatedly denied 
pre-trial release by the Cambodian Supreme Court, despite his ill-
health, and was released only after the conclusion of the July 2018 
national elections.101 
After removing the top two leaders of the CNRP, the Cambodian 
Interior Ministry filed a lawsuit in October 2017 seeking to dissolve the 
CNRP along with various other smaller opposition parties for failing to 
comply with the amended Law on Political Parties.102 The Cambodian 
Supreme Court acquiesced almost immediately, dissolving the CNRP 
and other opposition parties after a one-day hearing, holding that none 
of the parties had complied with the arduous registration and 
bookkeeping procedures demanded by the amended Law on Political 
Parties.103 Following the dissolution of Cambodia’s main opposition 
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parties, many former CNRP and other opposition politicians have been 
pressured to join the CPP.104 With the CNRP disbanded, a host of small 
new political parties emerged in advance of the July 2018 elections.105 
These parties are commonly referred to by Cambodians as “firefly” 
parties, as they suddenly appear shortly before an election and then 
promptly disappear as soon as the election is over.106 These firefly 
parties are small, disorganized, and pose no realistic threat to the CPP’s 
ironclad grip on power.107 Indeed, many Cambodia-watchers surmise 
that such parties are, in fact, indirectly funded by the CPP itself, with 
the specific goal of maintaining a democratic veneer to appease donor 
states and to avoid economic sanctions.108 
With the threat of the CNRP removed, and no credible, organized 
opposition to replace it, all that remained for the CPP to secure a 
sweeping electoral victory was to ensure voter turnout.109 Opposition 
politicians and civil society actors called for a boycott of the election, 
in a movement dubbed the “clean finger” campaign.110 In response, the 
CPP-controlled Cambodian National Elections Council (“NEC”) fined 
the former CNRP politicians who called for the boycott, and the CPP 
engaged in intimidation tactics, suggesting that it was illegal to not vote 
and that those who failed to vote might be subject to repercussions.111 
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The CPP’s separate, systematic crackdown on the free press, including 
the forced closure of the longstanding Cambodia Daily newspaper and 
the forced sale of the other main independent news outlet, the Phnom 
Penh Post, to a CPP-affiliated Malaysian businessman, severely 
diminished the ability of Cambodians to access independent 
information in the lead-up to the election.112 Predictably, after 
removing all legitimate opposition, the CPP won a landslide victory in 
the July 2018 election, widely dismissed as a total democratic sham.113 
These and other similar actions of the CPP government not only 
undermine democracy and the protection of human rights in Cambodia, 
but also deeply compromise the rule of law, despite being pursued 
through seemingly legal means. In their substance and implementation, 
Cambodian laws such as the Criminal Code, the NGO Law, the 
amended Law on Political Parties, and to some extent, even the 
Cambodian Constitution flagrantly violate several of Fuller’s criteria 
of legality. 
Firstly, the regular insertion of vague language in Cambodia’s 
laws severely undermines the clarity of these laws.114 For example, the 
Cambodian Constitution suffers from considerable vagueness in terms 
of how certain rights are to be legally regulated and balanced against 
the need to maintain public order.115 Meanwhile, other laws, such as 
the Criminal Code and the amended Law on Political Parties, contain 
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numerous unclear provisions. Often these areas of vagueness pertain to 
critically important questions. For example, the NGO Law lacks clarity 
in terms of the critical question of on what grounds an NGO may be 
denied registration.116 
The vagueness of many Cambodian laws also impairs the 
generality of such laws, as the interpretation of vague provisions tends 
to fluctuate depending on whom the law is being applied to and what 
the CPP’s interests are, or at least are perceived to be. Consequently, 
while ordinary Cambodians may, for example, expect to be tried and 
punished severely when charged with a crime, typically without being 
afforded basic fair trial rights, Cambodian elites and CPP members 
routinely enjoy impunity for even the most serious crimes, even in the 
face of an abundance of inculpatory evidence.117 
Cambodian laws also regularly conflict with one another, both in 
terms of their substance and how they are interpreted and applied. For 
example, the Cambodian Constitution and the various human rights 
legal instruments Cambodia is party to confer a host of rights on 
Cambodian citizens.118 The CPP has pushed through legislation with 
seemingly no regard for the fact that aspects of such proposed laws 
routinely conflict quite directly with the Cambodian Constitution, 
Cambodia’s human rights treaty commitments and other preexisting 
laws. For example, although the Cambodian Constitution states that 
Cambodia is to be organized as a democracy with free speech, freedom 
of association, and the right to form political parties, the CPP regularly 
violates these rights, including through new laws, such as the amended 
Law on Political Parties, as discussed previously.119 This is also true of 
the interpretation of the various ambiguities that plague many 
Cambodian laws, which are typically interpreted by a pliant judiciary 
in line with the explicit or perceived wishes of the CPP, rather than in 
any attempt to create a broadly coherent, non-contradictory legal 
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system.120 Thus, laws are construed either strictly to limit the freedom 
of the CPP’s opponents, or broadly to facilitate the actions of 
Cambodia’s elite powerbrokers.121 This creates contradiction and 
further undermines clarity of the law. 
Finally, the extreme selectivity with which Cambodian laws are 
applied deeply impairs Fuller’s final rule of law criterion of 
“congruence” between the law and official action.122 For example, the 
CPP orchestrated the passage, and aggressively sought the enforcement 
of the amended Law on Political Parties in a clear effort to disband the 
CNRP.123 However, when asked what steps the government would take 
to safeguard the Cambodian Constitution’s requirement of democratic 
governance, Hun Sen incredibly invoked the separation of powers as 
the reason why the government lacked the legal authority to intervene 
to halt the ongoing erosion of democratic governance in Cambodia that 
the CPP itself has clearly been systematically orchestrating.124 This 
demonstrates how the CPP alternately invokes rule of law-based 
arguments when convenient, while ignoring basic rule of law 
requirements altogether when it proves inconvenient. 
Through these and other practices of obscuring the repeated 
violation of basic rule of law principles behind thinly constructed 
façades of legality, Cambodia’s legal system has come to exemplify 
what David Dyzenhaus refers to as “empty” “cycles of legality,” 
wherein “the content of legality is understood in an ever more formal 
or vacuous manner, resulting in the mere appearance or even the 
pretense of legality.”125 Such pretenses of legality abound in 
Cambodia, to the point that the concept of “law” itself in Cambodia has 
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largely come to be viewed domestically as merely constituting a certain 
kind of process through which the CPP exercises its power and exerts 
social control. Thus, as Cambodia has distanced itself from its chaotic 
and violent past, it continues to suffer from an acute and worsening rule 
of law deficit. This deficit is becoming less and less attributable to a 
lack of capacity, infrastructure, or funding, and more attributable to the 
CPP’s purposeful efforts to manipulate Cambodia’s laws and judiciary 
to further entrench itself in power.  
While the ECCC is clearly ill-equipped to step in to fully remedy 
these deep-seated structural rule of law shortcomings in Cambodia, the 
Court, its backers, and international criminal justice advocates more 
generally continue to claim that ICL institutions such as the ECCC have 
a wholly positive, if incremental, impact on the rule of law in post-
atrocity states such as Cambodia.126 The following part, through an 
analysis of the ECCC experience in Cambodia, demonstrates that this 
assumption glosses over the complex realities of what is ultimately a 
quite uncertain relationship between the pursuit of ICL accountability 
and the improvement of the rule of law in post-atrocity states. 
III. THE CASE 003 AND 004 CONTROVERSY AT THE 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBER IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA: 
A RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT 
A. The ECCC Experiment 
The ECCC, which began operations in 2006, has jurisdiction over 
specified international and domestic crimes committed between April 
17, 1975 and January 6, 1979, the precise time period the Khmer Rouge 
held power.127 The stated purpose of the ECCC is to try “senior leaders 
of [the Khmer Rouge] and those who were most responsible for the 
crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international 
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions 
recognized by Cambodia.”128 
 
126. See, e.g., MCAULIFFE, supra note 2, at 180–223; Vinjamuri, supra note 19, at 196-98. 
127. Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, art. 1, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter Agreement]. 
128. Id. 
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Cambodia’s rule of law shortcomings were a major factor in the 
creation of the ECCC and its ultimate constitution as a hybrid 
institution based in Cambodia. The negotiations leading to the creation 
were protracted and often contentious, in large part because of 
Cambodia’s insistence on maintaining control over any tribunal created 
and the United Nations’ concerns over the potential implications of 
such control given Cambodia’s rule of law deficit.129 Eventually, a 
complicated compromise was reached, whereby the ECCC was created 
as a specialized hybrid domestic/international chamber within the 
existing Cambodian judiciary.130 The core compromise struck in 
relation to the Cambodian versus international nature of the Court 
involved dividing the Court’s staff and judiciary. As such, the Court 
has both a Cambodian and international “Co-Prosecutor,” and each 
accused has both Cambodian and international defense counsel, and so 
on.131 The ECCC judiciary is similarly divided up in this way. As the 
Court follows civil law procedures for the most part, it has two “Co-
Investigating Judges,” one Cambodian and one international.132 
Meanwhile, each of the Court’s three judicial chambers–the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Supreme Court Chamber–have an odd 
number of judges, with one more Cambodian judge than international 
judge at each level.133 To prevent block voting by Cambodian judges, 
the United Nations negotiated a supermajority requirement, pursuant to 
which the decision of any chamber is only binding with the agreement 
of at least one international judge.134 
This convoluted system was created largely because of the 
impasse created by the Cambodian government’s insistence on the 
ECCC being a Cambodian court and the United Nations’ concerns 
 
129.  See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 341–408 (2012); CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13, at 14–102. 
See generally Steve Heder, A Review of the Negotiations Leading to the Establishment of the 
Personal Jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Apr. 26, 
2011), http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/reports/Final%20Revised%20Heder
%20Personal%20Jurisdiction%20Review.120426.pdf [https://perma.cc/URH9-87DW] (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2017).  
130. Agreement, supra note 127. 
131. See generally EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
INTERNAL RULES (REV.9) [INTERNAL RULES] (2015); see also CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra 
note 13, at 14–108; Jain, supra note 22. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
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about the rule of law and fair trial implications of such an outcome.135 
The compromise struck, while widely acknowledged as non-ideal, was 
viewed as acceptable partially because of the notion that by having 
Cambodian legal professionals work alongside international 
counterparts, the capacity of the ECCC’s staff would be built up, 
theoretically leading to an improved rule of law in Cambodia.136 
Thus far, however, this approach has not produced anything in the 
way of a tangible positive effect on the rule of law in Cambodia, let 
alone created conditions for a rule of law sea change. The ECCC, as an 
exceptional and temporary institution, has been alternately ignored and 
manipulated by Hun Sen and the CPP. Part of the CPP’s prestige and 
power is grounded in its construction of a straightforward narrative of 
stability, progress, and the elimination of armed conflict.137 According 
to this narrative, the CPP is the party made up of Cambodians who 
helped the Vietnamese oust the Khmer Rouge from power, eventually 
defeated the Khmer Rouge militarily, and ended Cambodia’s long 
period of conflict and atrocity.138 Over time, this narrative has become 
deeply entrenched, to the point that national days of remembrance of 
Khmer Rouge era atrocities and the end of this period of violence have 
become celebrations of the CPP itself.139 Commentators have 
suggested that maintenance of this uncomplicated narrative and the 
related goal of emphasizing the responsibility of the Khmer Rouge’s 
top leadership for atrocities, while downplaying the culpability of 
former mid-level Khmer Rouge cadres, has shaped the Cambodian 
government’s fluctuating relationship with the ECCC.140 At times, Hun 
Sen and the CPP have lauded the ECCC and highlighted the role the 
 
135. See SCHEFFER, supra note 129, at 341-408. 
136. This reasoning was routinely included in efforts to justify the creation of, and secure 
funding and political support for, the ECCC. For descriptions of these efforts at selling the 
ECCC, see MARTIN-ORTEGA & HERMAN, supra note 15; CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 
13, at 14–103. 
137. See Kirsten Ainley, Transitional Justice in Cambodia: The Coincidence of Power 
and Principle, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 125–56 (Renée Jeffery & Hun 
Joon Kim eds., 2014).  
138. Kirsten Ainley refers to this dominant constructed narrative as one of the CPP’s 
“rescue” of Cambodia. Id. at 149.  
139. See SAVINA SIRIK, EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES OF GENOCIDE SURVIVORS IN 
LANDSCAPES OF VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA 49 (2015). 
140. See, e.g., id; see also Stéphanie Giry, Necessary Scapegoats? The Making of the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (July 23, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/
daily/2012/07/23/necessary-scapegoats-khmer-rouge-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/EM5P-
ACR7]; STRANGIO, supra note 71, at 236–57. 
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Cambodian government has played in seeking justice for the atrocities 
of the Khmer Rouge era by helping create and supporting the Court.141 
At other times, Hun Sen and the CPP have dismissed the Court as 
irrelevant, refused to cooperate with it, or otherwise interfered with the 
Court’s work.142 Such interference has tended to occur when the 
ECCC’s proceedings have had the potential to stray from a narrative 
which places the blame for the atrocities committed under the Khmer 
Rouge wholly on Pol Pot and/or a select group of other key individuals, 
such as convicted ECCC accused Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan.143 
B. The Case 003 and 004 Controversy at the ECCC 
The longstanding controversy concerning how many suspects will 
be tried at the ECCC sits at the crux of the question of what narrative 
of Khmer Rouge culpability will ultimately emanate from the Court. 
As such, the controversy surrounding ECCC Cases 003 and 004 is 
emblematic of the complicated, often contentious relationships 
between the various parties with an interest in the ECCC, including the 
Cambodian government, Cambodian civil society actors, the United 
Nations, key donor countries, and domestic and international ECCC 
staff. As will become clear, much of the contention in these 
relationships relate closely to the rule of law, both in terms of 
competing conceptions of the role and independence of judicial 
institutions themselves, and in terms of the perceived tension between 
adherence to rule of law principles and fair trial rights in ECCC 
processes. 
In many ways, Cases 003 and 004 at the ECCC have become the 
cases that virtually no one, including the United Nations and donor 
countries, want, yet also have become the cases that may ultimately 
determine whether the Court is remembered as a success or failure. In 
a basic sense, the fundamental problem is that no readily apparent, 
legally justifiable avenue for ending the cases prior to trial exists that 
would not be broadly perceived as a politically motivated pretext.144 As 
 
141. See, e.g., STRANGIO, supra note 71, at 236–57. 
142. See id. 
143. Cases 003 and 004 for example, involve suspects who occupied levels of authority 
under the Khmer Rouge to those certain current CPP officials held while still members of the 
Khmer Rouge. See Giry, supra note 140. 
144. In this vein, see John D. Ciorciari, U.N. Credibility on Trial in Cambodia, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (May 4, 2015), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/un-credibility-trial-
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such, the cases have become a litmus test for assessing the resolve of 
the United Nations and the international community when confronted 
by the CPP’s political subversion of the rule of law at the ECCC and, 
by extension, in Cambodia.145 To date, the ECCC has failed this test 
rather miserably, as dominant public perception is that the Cambodian 
government has pursued a policy of preventing the cases from 
proceeding to trial that has, thus far, proven quite successful. As 
demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, the CPP has employed similar 
legal manipulation tactics to those it utilizes domestically to undermine 
Cases 003 and 004 and thereby maintain its clean “rescue” narrative.146 
As a result, the ECCC risks being perceived, especially by Cambodians 
all too familiar with the CPP’s manipulation of domestic courts, as 
being yet another example of the CPP exercising its power to inhibit 
unwanted criminal investigations and dictate the interpretation of key 
legal provisions, even when resultant interpretations seem to directly 
contradict prior interpretations of the same law. 
The five initial suspects in ECCC Cases 001 and 002 were 
relatively uncontroversial, as it was widely assumed that these 
individuals would be tried throughout the negotiation process leading 
to the creation of the Court.147 Case 001 concerned a single accused, 
Kaing Guek Eav, known by his alias, “Duch,” who had been the 
commander of the notorious Tuol Sleng “S-21” prison in Phnom Penh, 
today preserved as a museum.148 That Duch would be prosecuted was 
a near certainty, as when the ECCC was created he had already been 
detained by Cambodian authorities for nearly seven years.149 Absent 
prosecuting him at the ECCC, the Cambodian government was faced 
with the choice of either releasing Duch or treading down the path of 
domestic prosecutions, both of which the CPP preferred to avoid.150 
 
cambodia [https://perma.cc/MRF7-Y9X5]; see also PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra 
note 15, at 25–29. 
145. See Ciorciari, supra note 144. 
146. See Ainley, supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, 
supra note, 13 at 167-201; PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 15, at 26. 
147. See SCHEFFER, supra note 129 at 341-408; Heder, supra note 129. 
148. See Prosecutor v.  Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Appeal Judgment, Case No. 
001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC (Supreme Court Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Feb. 3, 2012). For an overview of Tuol Sleng prison, see DAVID CHANDLER, VOICES 
FROM S-21: TERROR AND HISTORY IN POL POT’S SECRET PRISON (1999) [hereinafter 
CHANDLER, VOICES FROM S-21]. 
149. See Heder, supra note 129, at 14-17. 
150. See id. 
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The accused in Case 002 were the four most senior (and socially 
visible) former Khmer Rouge leaders still alive when the Court began 
operations: Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan. 
Again, these individuals were uncontroversial, wholly expected 
suspects.151 Nuon Chea, often referred to as “Brother Number Two,” 
was Pol Pot’s closest confidant and second in command during the 
Khmer Rouge period.152 Khieu Samphan was the nominal head of state 
during this time, although his actual authority remains disputed.153 Ieng 
Sary was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and along with his wife, Ieng 
Thirith–herself the Minister of Social Affairs–was a member of Pol 
Pot’s inner circle.154 Although neither Ieng Sary nor Ieng Thirith 
survived long enough for the ECCC Trial Chamber to issue a judgment 
against them,155 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were convicted of 
various crimes in the first Case 002 trial156 and are currently awaiting 
judgment for additional crimes in a second trial.157 
From the perspective of the Cambodian government, the five 
accused in Cases 001 and 002 were sufficient. Prosecuting these select, 
high-level leaders, along with Duch, who ran the Khmer Rouge’s most 
notorious prison, would serve an honorific function of generally 
condemning the regime and would provide a neat bookend to the CPP’s 
carefully crafted narrative.158 Further prosecutions however, would 
create the possibility, however slight, of complicating this narrative. If 
the ECCC pursued regional commanders or other, lower-level Khmer 
Rouge officials, it might venture into a similar tier of Khmer Rouge 
 
151. See id.; SCHEFFER, supra note 129, at 341–408. 
152. Prosecutor v. NUON Chea & KHIEU Samphan, Judgment, 002/19-09-
2007/ECCC/TC, Doc. No. E313, Case 002/01, ¶¶ 303-348 (Trial Chamber, Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Aug. 7, 2014). 
153. See id. at ¶¶ 349-409. 
154. See generally KIERNAN, supra note 61; Heder, supra note 129; SCHEFFER, supra note 
129, at 341–408. 
155. Ieng Thirith was found unfit to stand trial in 2012 due to suffering from dementia and 
died in 2015. Ieng Sary died in 2013 during the Case 002 trial. See Thomas Fuller, Ieng Thirith, 
Khmer Rouge Minister in Cambodia, Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 22, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/world/asia/ieng-thirith-khmer-rouge-minister-in-
cambodia-dies-at-83.html. 
156. NUON Chea & KHIEU Samphan, Judgment, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Doc. No. 
E313, Case 002/01, ¶¶ 303-348. 
157. Case 002 was bifurcated into a series of trials due to its massive scope. See Prosecutor 
v. NUON Chea, Severance Order Pursuant to Rule 89TER, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, (Trial 
Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Sept. 22, 2011). 
158. On this narrative, see Ainley, supra note 137. 
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leadership formerly occupied by certain key CPP members, including 
Hun Sen himself, before they defected to Vietnam.159 It also might 
address times and places where some of these officials operated while 
still Khmer Rouge members, thereby dredging up an uncomfortable 
past for the CPP and complicating its carefully managed narrative.160 
Against this backdrop, former International Co-Prosecutor Robert 
Petit initiated Cases 003 and 004, by submitting two introductory 
submissions to the ECCC Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in 
November 2008.161 While a detailed history of these cases is beyond 
the scope of this Article, a basic summary of this history is necessary 
in order to understand and contextualize their rule of law implications. 
These cases initially involved a total of five suspects, each of whom 
were alleged to have participated in various atrocity crimes involving 
many hundreds of thousands of victims, including multiple hundreds 
of thousands of deaths.162 The suspects in Case 003 were Meas Muth 
and Sou Met.163 Meas Muth is alleged to have been a Khmer Rouge 
military commander whose authority included control of the navy.164 
In this capacity, he is alleged to have participated in a variety of 
domestic and international crimes, including genocide and the crimes 
against humanity of murder, extermination, enslavement, 
imprisonment, torture, persecution, and various other inhumane acts.165 
 
159. See generally STRANGIO, supra note 71; see also PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, 
supra note 15 at 26 (“While the government has publicly stated that pursuing Cases 003 and 004 
could compromise political stability in Cambodia, most court observers reject it as a 
smokescreen for the real concern that the cases, which involve cadre with connections to the 
ruling [CPP], may embarrass the party and its leader, Hun Sen.”) (citing Giry, supra note 140). 
160. See STRANGIO, supra note 71; PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 15, at 26. 
161. These Introductory Submissions were officially confidential, yet were leaked to the 
press and widely disseminated in the media. For a general background of the initiation of Cases 
003 and 004, see generally OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004 
AT THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (2012) [hereinafter THE 
FUTURE OF CASES 003/004]. 
162. See Douglas Gillison, Crime Scenes of the Khmer, THE INVESTIGATIVE FUND (Feb. 
27, 2012), https://www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigation/2012/02/27/crime-scenes-khmer/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8HW-8DBD]. 
163. See Randle C. DeFalco, Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The 
Definition of “Most Responsible” Individuals According to International Criminal Law, 8 
GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 45, 56 (2014); PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 
15, at 26. 
164. See DeFalco, supra note 163, at 56; PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 15, 
at 26. 
165.  Meas Muth, ECCC, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/meas-muth 
[https://perma.cc/HS5S-CQGN] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
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Sou Met, another military commander alleged to have been in charge 
of the Khmer Rouge air force, died in 2013, terminating proceedings 
against him.166 
Meanwhile, Case 004 initially concerned three suspects: Ao An, 
Im Chaem and Yim Tith.167 Ao An is alleged to have held the position 
of deputy secretary of the Central Zone during the Khmer Rouge 
period,168 during which time Cambodia’s provinces were reorganized 
into “[z]ones” and administered by “secretaries”, whose positions were 
akin to that of a state or provincial governor.169 In this capacity, Ao An 
is alleged to have participated in widespread purges carried out at 
various prisons and internment camps in central and eastern 
Cambodia.170 Im Chaem, the second woman, along with the now-
deceased Ieng Thirith, to be investigated by the ECCC, is alleged to 
have been placed in charge of Preah Net Preah district in Northwestern 
Cambodia in 1977, where she is alleged to have overseen forced labor 
at a massive dam construction site and been in charge of Phnom 
Trayoung prison, where many thousands of victims were imprisoned 
and executed.171 Finally, Yim Tith is alleged to have held various 
positions at the district, sector and zone levels in Northwestern 
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period and to have participated in 
various international crimes committed at a host of prisons, execution 
sites and forced labor camps.172 
Cases 003 and 004 proved controversial from their very inception 
and have remained so as they have slowly wound their way through 
their respective investigative phases for nearly a decade.173 The 
introductory submissions in both cases were filed without the assent of 
Cambodian ECCC Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang, signaling the possibility 
 
166. Lauren Crothers, Khmer Rouge War Crimes Suspect Sou Met Dead, THE CAMBODIA 
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of a broader recalcitrance amongst the ECCC’s Cambodian staff 
towards moving the cases forward that has since materialized.174 
Nonetheless, the ECCC’s internal rules clearly mandate that 
investigations are to proceed, even when the subject of disagreement 
between the Co-Prosecutors or Co-Investigating Judges, and so the 
investigations have remained officially open since 2008.175 
Since the very inception of Cases 003 and 004, the CPP has 
maintained a general stance of opposition to their proceeding to trial. 
This opposition has been made clear via various public statements 
made by Hun Sen and other prominent CPP officials.176 Meanwhile, 
most of the Cambodian staff at the ECCC, including the Court’s 
Cambodian judges, have tended to follow the lead of the CPP, stymying 
key investigatory efforts and at times refusing to participate in the 
investigations altogether.177 Numerous International Court staff have 
quit out of frustration with their inability to investigate and move these 
cases forward, including all four International Co-Investigating Judges 
who preceded current International Co-Investigating Judge Michael 
Bohlander.178 Indeed, shortly before resigning himself, former Co-
Investigating Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, who had been blocked 
from having the “reserve” designation removed from his title when his 
predecessor, Marcel Lemonde, resigned, issued a public decision 
describing the “egregious dysfunction” within the ECCC in relation to 
the Cases 003 and 004 investigations.179 
 
174. See id.; THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004, supra note 161. 
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Meanwhile, Cambodian Co-Investigating Judge You Bunleng has 
consistently expressed a desire to end the cases as soon as possible, 
adhering consistently to the view that none of the Case 003 and 004 
suspects should be considered “senior leaders” or “most responsible” 
individuals and therefore do not fall within the ambit of the ECCC’s 
personal jurisdiction.180 This opinion is shared by Chea Leang, who 
has, from the very inception of Cases 003 and 004 maintained that 
“only the existing accused [in Cases 001 and 002] at the ECCC are the 
senior leaders and most responsible persons” and “priority, therefore, 
should be given to the prosecution of those accused in order to 
sufficiently fulfill the [Court’s] mandate.”181 Coincidentally, both 
Judge You and Chea Leang are members of the Cambodian Supreme 
Council of Magistracy, and were hence, involved in blocking Judge 
Kasper-Ansermet from assuming his position.182 
This correlation, between the wishes of the CPP as they are 
broadly socially perceived, and the action of Cambodian officials and 
judges, is quite familiar to those aware of how the rule of law is 
subverted in domestic Cambodian courts. Statements made by Hun Sen 
and other prominent CPP figures, often in the form of off-the-cuff 
remarks at public events, signal the wishes of the CPP to all 
Cambodians, including ECCC staffers. While such statements are, 
most often, not addressed to any specific individual and do not demand 
any specific actions, they tend to be interpreted as quasi-official CPP 
policy statements. Relevant Cambodian officials, including those 
working at the ECCC, who are reliant on patronage networks for social 
and professional advancement, know full well that if they help 
effectuate the desired outcomes of those holding power, they are likely 
to be rewarded in due course.183 Conversely, those who are seen to be 
obstructing the wishes of those more powerful than themselves risk 
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being personally and professionally ostracized, or even made the target 
of reprisals in the form of spurious criminal allegations or even 
violence.184 
The net result is that the CPP is able to influence public officials 
and the judiciary without ever needing to resort to explicitly ordering 
them what to do, holding clandestine meetings, or even making any 
direct contact with them. Instead, Cambodia’s most powerful 
individuals simply make their wishes publicly known, with the implicit 
promise of social advancement for those who help effectuate such 
wishes. Dense webs of patronage networks take care of the rest.185 
This pattern seems to be taking place at the ECCC, as the 
Cambodian staff has worked to impede the progress of Cases 003 and 
004 in near lock-step.186 For years the cases seemed to be locked in a 
stalemate, with investigations proceeding in fits and starts.187 While the 
investigations remained officially confidential for years, the identities 
of the five suspects were a matter of public knowledge, with some of 
the suspects even granting interviews.188 Nonetheless, all indications 
suggest an increasing unlikelihood that trials of any of the four 
remaining suspects will ever occur, as in 2017, the Co-Investigating 
Judges dismissed all charges against Im Chaem189 and floated the idea 
of issuing a permanent stay of the charges against Ao An, Yim Tith and 
Meas Muth.190 
C. The Rule of Law Implications of Cases 003 and 004 
Understanding the domestic rule of law implications for 
Cambodia of the ongoing saga of Cases 003 and 004 at the ECCC 
requires a fine-grained analysis of applicable law in light of the 
particularities of how the rule of law is subverted in Cambodia. As 
 
184. See MOONEY & BAYDAS, supra note 16, at 10–11; see generally Adams, supra note 
53. 
185.  See STRANGIO, supra note 71, at 134. 
186. See, e.g., PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 15, at 26-29. 
187. See, e.g., id. 
188. See, e.g., Julia Wallace, The Bucolic Life of a Cambodian Grandmother Accused of 
Mass Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/
cambodia-khmer-rouge-im-chaem.html [hereinafter Wallace, Bucolic Life]. 
189. See Prosecutor v. IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. 
D308/3, Closing Order (Reasons) (Public Redacted Version) (Office of the Co-Investigating 
Judges, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, July 10, 2017). 
190. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2017), supra note 180. 
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McCarthy and Un argue, within the domestic context, the CPP and 
other Cambodian elites tend to treat law as merely a tool in the service 
of maintaining order and the status quo.191 While willing to pay lip 
service to Constitutional guarantees of liberal democratic governance, 
free speech rights, and the independence of the judiciary, the CPP only 
tolerates such independence so long as it does not threaten or embarrass 
the party or its patrons.192 From this perspective, one may quite 
reasonably conclude that the Cambodian government has, to date, 
allowed the ECCC to operate independently, so long as the Court does 
not present the risk of threatening CPP interests, including the 
maintenance of its foundational “rescue” narrative.193 
Meanwhile, the United Nations, legal commentators, and 
international justice organizations have generally tended to support 
Cases 003 and 004 both proceeding to trial, citing the mantra of anti-
impunity and arguing that the rule of law demands trials in these 
cases.194 The impasse that has resulted is largely a product of the fact 
that proponents of the cases proceeding to trial have raised arguments 
that appear legally accurate in a substantive sense.195 However, as 
noted above, the CPP does not necessarily conceptualize the rule of law 
along these lines.196 Moreover, there are multiple levels of legal 
considerations relevant to the outcomes of the two cases and the 
contentious nature of the investigations. In particular, alleged 
investigatory irregularities in the cases create fair trial concerns of their 
own, further complicating the rule of law implications of the 
controversy surrounding them. 
The main legal question relating to whether trials are appropriate 
in Cases 003 and 004 concerns whether the suspects–Ao An, Im 
Chaem, Meas Muth, Yim Tith and, before his death, Sou Met–fall 
 
191. See McCarthy & Un, supra note 49; see generally MOONEY & BAYDAS, supra note 
16. 
192. See generally Wallace, ‘Fireflies’ and ‘Ghosts,’ supra note 104; MOONEY & BAYDAS, 
supra note 16. 
193. See Ainley, supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004, supra note 161; Cambodia: Stop Blocking 
Justice for Khmer Rouge Crimes, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/03/22/cambodia-stop-blocking-justice-khmer-rouge-crimes 
[https://perma.cc/SK9V-226R]. 
195. For an overview of the legal issues related to Cases 003 and 004 and why there does 
not appear to be any legitimate avenue for ending the cases judicially absent trials, or dismissals 
based on the evidence itself, see, e.g., THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004, supra note 161. 
196. See McCarthy & Un, supra note 49. 
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within the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC in the first place.197 As 
previously noted, the ECCC Agreement contains language seeming to 
limit the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction to individuals qualifying as 
either former “senior leaders” of the Khmer Rouge or those “most 
responsible” for the atrocities committed during the Khmer Rouge’s 
reign.198 Case 001 accused Duch argued in his appeal filings that he did 
not qualify as either a senior leader or most responsible person and that 
consequently, the ECCC lacked personal jurisdiction over him.199 This 
argument was dismissed by the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber, which 
held that the relevant language in the ECCC Agreement is best 
interpreted as a guide to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and is 
thus not a true, strictly enforceable jurisdictional element.200 Such 
discretion is, however, according to the Chamber, bounded by general 
duties of good faith.201 In rejecting Duch’s appeal,202 the Supreme 
Court Chamber implicitly concluded that the decision to classify Duch 
as a most responsible individual fell within these broad limits. 
Given the holding of the Supreme Court Chamber, its status as the 
ECCC’s highest appellate chamber, and its implicit finding that it was 
reasonable for the ECCC Co-Prosecutors, Co-Investigating Judges and 
Trial Chamber, to consider Duch a “most responsible” individual, there 
does not appear to be any legally sound mechanism for concluding 
either Case 003 or 004 without trials on jurisdictional grounds.203 
However, instead of basing their opinion that Cases 003 and 004 
should not proceed to trial wholly on evidentiary considerations or 
doubt concerning the guilt of the relevant suspects, those opposed to 
the cases, including International Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang and Co-
Investigating Judge You Bunleng, have continued to maintain the 
position that none of the suspects fall under the ECCC’s personal 
jurisdiction.204 This position, while seemingly reasonable at first 
 
197. See DeFalco, supra note 163. 
198. Agreement, supra note 127, art. 1. 
199. Prosecutor v.  Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Appeal Judgment, Case No. 001/18-07-
2007-ECCC/SC, ¶¶ 21-24 (Supreme Court Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Feb. 3, 2012).  
200. Id. at ¶ 74. 
201. Id. at ¶ 80. 
202. Id. at 320 (disposition of the Chamber, dismissing the defense appeal). 
203. See, e.g., PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, supra note 15, at 28; DeFalco, supra note 
163. 
204. See ECCC OFFICE OF THE CO-PROSECUTORS, supra note 181; RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS (2017), supra note 180, at 4. 
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glance, becomes highly questionable when considering Duch’s 
conviction in Case 001 and the implicit characterization of Duch as a 
“most responsible” individual. ICL jurisprudence lays out a host of 
criteria to be used in the assessment of the relative responsibility of 
various suspects implicated in atrocity crimes and the determination of 
who, in a legal sense, qualifies as a “most responsible” individual.205 
These criteria emphasize the gravity of the alleged crimes and the 
relevant individual’s relative degree of probable culpability therefor.206 
Thus, an individual who participated in, but was not necessarily the 
driving force behind the commission of an especially large-scale crime, 
may be characterized as “most responsible,” as can an individual who 
was the driving force behind the commission of a comparatively less 
serious crime.207 
Of course, there is no mathematical formula which can be used to 
definitively determine whether any specific individual qualifies as 
“most responsible.” However, when one compares Cases 001 with 
Cases 003 and 004 at the ECCC, the suspects in the latter cases all 
appear to be at least as responsible for Khmer Rouge era atrocity 
crimes, if not more so, than Duch. The main difference between the 
cases is that Duch’s crimes occurred at Tuol Sleng, an especially visible 
and high-profile prison. Tuol Sleng occupies a significant place in the 
history of the Khmer Rouge regime because it was where foreigners, 
high-level “internal enemies,” and other special prisoners were sent to 
be tortured and executed, and still stands as a museum and tourist 
attraction.208 It was, however, only one of nearly two-hundred prisons 
established by the Khmer Rouge nationwide and was far from the 
 
205. For an overview of this jurisprudence, see DeFalco, supra note 163, at 51-55; 
CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13, 169–73. 
206. I have conducted a detailed analysis of these factors, which focus generally on the 
gravity of the relevant crimes (in terms of severity of harms and number of victims) and the 
suspects’ relative culpability (in terms of the importance of the suspect’s role in the overall 
commission of the relevant crimes), elsewhere. See DeFalco, supra note 163; see also 
CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13, 169–73; Michael G. Karnavas, “But Duch is a Senior 
Leader/Most Responsible While Chaem is Not?”, INT’L CRIM. L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), 
http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/02/27/duch-vs-chaem/ [https://perma.cc/E28Y-G5YF] 
[hereinafter Karnavas, But Duch]. 
207. See generally DeFalco, supra note 163; cf. Karnavas, But Duch, supra note 206. 
208. For an overview of the workings of this prison, see CHANDLER, VOICES FROM S-21, 
supra note 148. 
2018] LESSONS FROM CAMBODIA 45 
largest in terms of the total number of victims killed.209 Various other 
prisons, including those subject to investigation in Cases 003 and 004 
were, in fact, clearly far larger operations.210 
Duch’s authority was also strictly confined to Tuol Sleng itself, 
and he was under standing orders to execute every single prisoner he 
received.211 Duch thus had virtually no discretion, except in choosing 
whom to torture and how. Indeed, numerous Tuol Sleng guards and 
workers were themselves arrested, imprisoned at Tuol Sleng itself, and 
executed.212 While none of the Case 003 or 004 suspects held positions 
in the top echelons of the Khmer Rouge’s hierarchical command 
structure (and hence, are, like Duch, unlikely to qualify as “senior 
leaders”), each of them appears to have wielded a degree of local and/or 
regional influence far greater than Duch.213 Such influence appears to 
have included the authority to order, or decline to order, executions.214 
 
209. For a list of crimes sites investigated in Cases 003 and 004, see Case 003 & 004 
Crime Sites, ECCC (Oct. 2013), https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Case%20003-
004%20Crime%20Sites_ENG_OCT%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8ZG-98ZN]. For a rough 
list of mass grave sites in Cambodia (which have not been systematically mapped or exhumed), 
see Mapping Project: 1995-Present, DOCUMENTATION CTR. OF CAMBODIA, 
http://www.d.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Mapping.htm [https://perma.cc/3CZK-6N55]. This is 
not to suggest that Tuol Sleng is not an important crime site, but merely to assert that there were 
many prisons and mass execution sites throughout Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period 
of at least comparable size. 
210. See Case 003 & 004 Crime Sites, supra note 209; Mapping Project: 1995-Present, 
supra note 209. 
211. See generally CHANDLER, VOICES FROM S-21, supra note 148. 
212. See id. 
213. While it is impossible to accurately assess the alleged authority and culpability of the 
four remaining Case 003 and 004 suspects in the absence of full disclosure of available evidence 
and trial processes, all indications are that each of the suspects directly implemented brutal 
Khmer Rouge policies, including overseeing the commission of extreme violence. See, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. D308/3, 
Closing Order (Reasons) (Public Redacted Version) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, July 10, 2017); DeFalco, supra note 163, at 56-57; CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra 
note 13, at 176-177. According to leaked cables from the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, there 
exists evidence that at least some of the Case 003 and 004 suspects “took direct orders from the 
likes of DK Security Minister and Pol Pot himself to carry out purges and ‘smashing’ [i.e. killing 
by execution] on a mass scale.” CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13, at 176 (quoting U.S. 
Embassy Phnom Penh, Cable 09PHNOMPENH648, Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Five More for 
Prosecution ¶ 5, WIKILEAKS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.wikileaks.org/ cable/2009/09/
09PHNOMPENH648.html). 
214. IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. D308/3, Closing 
Order (Reasons) (Public Redacted Version) at ¶ 175 (finding that evidence exists suggesting that 
Im Chaem held the authority to order executions). 
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Thus, while none of the Case 003 or 004 suspects appear to have 
occupied positions at the very top of the Khmer Rouge hierarchy, 
strong evidence implicates all of them in atrocities involving more 
victims than those in Case 001, including in terms of total deaths.215 
Moreover, as regional authority figures operating in Cambodia’s 
countryside, rather than at a prison in Phnom Penh under the direct 
authority of the Khmer Rouge’s top leadership, each of these suspects 
clearly exercised far more discretionary power than Duch.216 There has 
been no suggestion from either of the ECCC Co-Prosecutors or any 
ECCC judges that Duch should not be considered amongst those 
individuals considered “most responsible” for the atrocities of the 
Khmer Rouge era. These basic facts render Duch’s conviction an 
inconvenient impediment to any finding that the Case 003 and 004 
suspects are not also properly considered “most responsible” 
individuals.217 
The decision of the Co-Investigating Judges dismissing the 
charges against Im Chaem, arguably the least senior of all four 
 
215. For an overview of the sites investigated in Cases 003 and 004, see Case 003 & 004 
Crime Sites, supra note 209. Estimates of the number of deaths that occurred at the various sites 
investigated in Cases 003 and 004 vary. See, e.g., Gillison, supra note 162. In 2009, demographic 
experts appointed by the ECCC assessed the various death toll estimates of the Khmer Rouge 
period, finding that the “most likely” number of excess deaths during the Khmer Rouge period 
ranges from 1.747 to 2.2 million individuals. EWA TABEAU & KHEAM THEY, KHMER ROUGE 
VICTIMS IN CAMBODIA, APRIL 1975 - JANUARY 1979: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR 
ESTIMATES 70 (2009), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/
courtdoc/D140_1_1_Public_Redacted_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/TKP2-3J63] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2018). 
216. See, e.g., IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. D308/3, 
Closing Order (Reasons) (Public Redacted Version); DeFalco, supra note 163 at 56-57; 
CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 13 at 176-177. 
217. This is not to suggest that this conclusion is universally shared. For example, ECCC 
defense counsel Michael Karnavas, argue that the position that a good-faith comparison of the 
Case 003 and 004 suspects with Duch requires a finding that such suspects be legally 
characterized as “most responsible” amounts to an improper usurpation of the judicial function. 
Karnavas contends that the argument that Duch’s prosecution demands, in a legal sense, that the 
Case 003 and 004 suspects be tried, amounts to “[p]olicy-driven arguments grounded in 
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discretion, including inconsistent interpretation and application of the law, thus demonstrating 
how vague legal language facilitates political interference in legal processes. 
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remaining Case 003 and 004 suspects, is illustrative in this regard. In 
2015, Im Chaem was formally charged with a variety of domestic and 
international crimes, including the crimes against humanity of 
extermination, murder, enslavement, persecution, imprisonment, and 
other inhumane acts (in the form of enforced disappearances and 
attacks against human dignity resulting from deprivation of adequate 
food).218 These charges were based on her alleged supervisory role at 
the Phnom Trayoung prison and execution site, the Spean Sreng 
worksite, and the cooperatives within the Preah Net Preah district in 
Northwest Cambodia from mid-1977 to 1979.219 During this time Im 
Chaem, according to her own statements and the findings of the Co-
Investigating Judges, exercised local authority over the Preah Net 
Preah district.220 It is impossible to know, with any specificity, how 
many victims were killed in the areas under Im Chaem’s authority 
between 1977 and 1979. This unknowability is unsurprising, given that 
no systematic forensic survey of Cambodia’s numerous mass grave 
sites has ever been conducted, and it is therefore impossible to know 
the precise number of victims killed at any specific location.221 
Moreover, efforts at such “body counting” fail to account for the vast 
number of Cambodians who were not imprisoned or executed, yet were 
still victims of serious crimes at the worksites, prisons, and 
cooperatives allegedly under Im Chaem’s authority from 1977 to 1979. 
These victims were overworked at forced labor sites, denied minimally 
 
218. See IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. D308/3, 
Closing Order (Reasons) (Public Redacted Version), at ¶ 4.  
219. See id., at ¶¶ 158-60. 
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[https://perma.cc/Y4LH-VDCQ] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); Wallace, Bucolic Life, supra note 
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221. One estimate places the number of victims killed at Phnom Trayoung prison at 
roughly 40,000 victims, most of which being killed from 1977 onwards, when the area was 
internally purged on orders of the Khmer Rouge leadership. IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-
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is at best, a rough estimate. See id., at ¶¶ 127-35. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that mass 
killings occurred in the area, and together with Yim Tith, high estimates are that Im Chaem may 
be responsible for up to 560,000 deaths. See, e.g., Wallace, Bucolic Life, supra note 188. While 
these estimates may be on the high end, in terms of total number of victims, even if reduced by 
half or more, the resulting number of victims remains in the many thousands and significantly 
higher than the number of victims killed at Tuol Sleng. 
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adequate sustenance, and subject to the constant threat of being beaten 
or executed.222 
Numerous statements of survivors still living in the Preah Net 
Preah area suggest both that Phnom Trayoung prison was a large 
operation involving mass executions and that Im Chaem was heavily 
involved in its day-to-day operations from 1977 to 1979. For example, 
in an interview with the Documentation Center of Cambodia’s 
Promoting Accountability project team, Khmer Rouge period survivor 
Thip Samphatt, who was detained at Phnom Trayoung prison in August 
1978, claims to have been shown a letter by the prison warden, a man 
named Soeun.223 According to Samphatt, the letter, which he 
remembers being stamped and signed by Im Chaem herself, stated that 
Samphatt and two of his friends had “betrayed the revolution and 
therefore had to give their blood to the revolution” (i.e. were to be 
executed).224 Samphatt only survived because he was on friendly terms 
with Soeun, who reassigned him and his friends, rather than having 
them executed.225 Samphatt also saw Im Chaem herself visit the prison 
on several occasions, and described her as being visibly pregnant and 
using a specific motorbike—which were rare during the Khmer Rouge 
regime.226 He also described witnessing mass executions firsthand.227 
Samphatt’s seemingly damning evidence is just one example of 
numerous survivor accounts that strongly indicate both that Im Chaem 
had authority over the Phnom Trayoung prison, and that she had the 
specific authority to decide who was to be executed. Moreover, the 
more general, uncontroverted fact remains that Im Chaem’s arrival in 
the area coincided with a massive increase in arrests and executions.228 
 
222. See generally IM Chaem, Case File No 004/1/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Doc. No. 
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Nonetheless, in July 2017, the Co-Investigating Judges issued a 
Closing Order dismissing all charges against Im Chaem, holding that 
she does not qualify as a “most responsible” person and therefore falls 
outside the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC.229 In the decision, the 
Co-Investigating Judges, noting that civil law jurisdictions do not 
follow a strict policy of stare decisis, disagreed with the Supreme Court 
Chamber’s holding that the terms “senior leaders” and “most 
responsible” do not represent a true limit on the Court’s personal 
jurisdiction.230 Instead, in the view of the Co-Investigating Judges, 
such language is truly jurisdictional in nature, although it “entails a 
wide but not entirely non-justiciable margin of appreciation”.231 The 
Co-Investigating Judges also interpreted various fair trial legal 
maxims, such as those of in dubio pro reo and nullum crimen sine lege, 
as militating towards a narrow view of who qualifies as a “most 
responsible” person.232 In terms of the factual determination of whether 
a suspect qualifies as most responsible, they were of the view that “the 
degree to which the offender was able to contribute to or even 
determine policies and or their implementation” represents an 
“important” yet non-determinative assessment factor.233 
While the publicly available version of the Co-Investigating 
Judges' Closing Order is heavily redacted,234 the two Judges quite 
clearly found that Im Chaem held a significant degree of localized 
power, including direct authority over Phnom Trayoung prison. They 
also found that Im Chaem “was in overall charge of [the Preah Net 
Preah] district, including its communes and villages” along with 
relevant security centers (i.e. prisons) and worksites.235 Not only did 
 
Investigating Judges, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, July 10, 2017); 
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Im Chaem exercise such general authority in the area, but the Co-
Investigating Judges further found that she had the discretionary 
authority to directly order arrests and executions throughout the 
district.236 
While the remainder of the Closing Order reasons are mostly 
redacted, the basic facts that Im Chaem exercised direct authority over 
Phnom Trayoung prison and, unlike Duch, had the apparent authority 
to choose who was to be arrested, imprisoned, and executed, seems to 
make her degree of relative responsibility for the atrocities of the 
Khmer Rouge period at least roughly equivalent to, if not significantly 
greater than, that of Duch. While somewhat speculative, this very point 
has been made by various commentators, many of whom have argued 
that the non-redacted portion of the Closing Order provides insufficient 
reasoning to warrant dismissal of the charges against Im Chaem on 
jurisdictional grounds.237 
Current ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Nicholas Koumjian 
unsuccessfully appealed the decision dismissing the charges against Im 
Chaem to the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber, which, in a 3-2 decision split 
along national/international lines, upheld the Co-Investigating Judges’ 
highly questionable finding that Im Chaem does not legally qualify as 
a “most responsible” individual.238 While the Chamber largely agreed 
on a number of matters immaterial to the ultimate disposition of the 
question of whether Im Chaem would be tried or not, the national and 
international judges sharply disagreed in their respective analyses of 
both the methods through which the Co-Investigating Judges assessed 
whether Im Chaem qualified as a most responsible individual, and their 
ultimate outcome that she did not.239 In considering this fundamentally 
important question, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s three Cambodian judges, 
Prak Kimsan, Ney Thol, and Huot Vuthy, assessed the issue and upheld 
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the order to dismiss the charges against Im Chaem in a mere ten 
paragraphs.240 This brief analysis failed to engage, in any substantive 
sense, the question of whether Im Chaem should be tried as a most 
responsible individual, or to even scrutinize the means and arguments 
through which the Co-Investigating Judges arrived at the conclusion 
that she is not a most responsible individual. 
In contrast, Pre-Trial Chamber international judges Judge Olivier 
Beauvallet and Judge Kang Jin Baik engaged in a thorough and, at 
times, scathing analysis of both the processes through which the Co-
Investigating Judges assessed Im Chaem’s relative responsibility and 
their ultimate outcome.241 Judges Beauvallet and Baik chastised the 
Co-Investigating Judges’ overly formal approach to evidentiary 
assessment, wherein the Co-Investigating Judges repeatedly dismissed 
evidence of mass killings and abuse in situations where a relatively 
precise number of total victims could not be accurately estimated. To 
the contrary, Beauvallet and Baik pointed out that while it may be 
impossible to know how many victims were killed at a particular site, 
this in no way refutes the basic fact that numerous victims were, in fact, 
killed.242 Judges Beauvallet and Baik concluded that “the scale scope 
and impact of the crimes for which IM Chaem could be held 
responsible when her criminal conduct is considered in full are 
significantly greater than what was taken into account in the Co-
Investigating Judges’ assessment of gravity.”243 Rather, the two Judges 
found that the “evidence further sufficiently supports under the 
requisite probability standard the conclusion that not less than tens of 
thousands of people were victims of crimes at charged and uncharged 
sites, for which IM Chaem could be held responsible.”244 
While this decision likely spells the final conclusion of 
proceedings against Im Chaem, the sharp disagreement between the 
national and international Pre-Trial Chamber judges can only stoke 
arguments that the ECCC is being manipulated by the CPP just like 
domestic Cambodian courts routinely are. 
Given the outcome of the case against Im Chaem, the CPP’s 
perceived opposition to the cases, and the fact that the Co-Investigating 
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Judges have already floated the idea of issuing a permanent stay for all 
Case 003 and 004 proceedings due to funding shortfalls and resultant 
fair trial concerns,245 it remains highly doubtful that the cases against 
Ao An, Yim Tith or Meas Muth will ever go to trial. Given the seeming 
inevitability that neither Case 003 nor 004 will ever produce a trial, 
how the cases conclude and what justifications are provided for ending 
them without trials, has become important to the ECCC’s legacy, 
including in terms of its relationship to the rule of law in Cambodia. 
Arguments grounded in the rule of law have been central to 
assessments of the treatment of Cases 003 and 004.246 Those critical of 
the likely shutdown of the cases prior to trial have made arguments 
grounded in notions that the law must be applied in an evenhanded, 
clear, and transparent manner.247 Those who have welcomed the 
dismissal of the cases–thus far, primarily the CPP and ECCC defense 
counsel–have made rule of law-based arguments citing the need to 
respect judicial independence, to protect fair trial rights, and to avoid 
the insertion of emotional, moral, or ethical reasoning into legal 
argumentation and decision-making.248 
 
245. Ultimately, Co-Investigating Judges Bohlander and You deferred the decision as to 
whether to dismiss the cases based on budgetary concerns. Case File No. 004/2/07-09-2009-
ECCC-OCIJ, Combined Decision on the Impact of the Budgetary Situation on Cases 003, 004 
and 004/2 and Related Submissions by the Defence for Yim Tith, Doc. No. D349/6, ¶ 69 (Office 
of the Co-Investigating Judges, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Aug. 11, 
2017) (holding that the judges “defer the decision on stay for the time being but will remain 
actively seised of the matter until the last closing order has been issued”); see also Erin Handley, 
Tribunal Ruling to Keep Cases Open Welcomed, ‘Threats’ Decried, PHNOM PENH POST (Aug. 
14, 2017, 6:54 ICT), http://uat.phnompenhpost.com/national/tribunal-ruling-keep-cases-open-
welcomed-threats-decried [https://perma.cc/LL6S-59Z2] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018); RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS (2017), supra note 180 at 4 (“All current indications are that, even with 
adequate funding, none of [Cases 003 and 004] will be tried at the ECCC.”). 
246. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004, supra note 161, at 5 (calling for “an 
impartial, judicial and non-political disposition of Cases 003/004, through genuine, credible, and 
thorough investigations into all allegations”). 
247.  See Wallace, Bucolic Life, supra note 188; Erin Handley, Im Chaem Filing Short on 
Reasoning, PHNOM PENH POST (July 11, 2017), http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/im-
chaem-filing-short-reasoning [https://perma.cc/2D5J-DLP9]; THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004, 
supra note 161, at 5. 
248. For example, ECC defense counsel Michael Karnavas, in his personal blog argues 
that the dismissal of Im Chaem’s charges is rule of law victory for the ECCC. However, 
Karnavas’ arguments are based on an alternate set of assumptions concerning the motivations 
of the Co-Investigating Judges in terms of their approach to protecting fair trial rights. See 
Karnavas, But Duch, supra note 206; Michael G. Karnavas, The ECCC Co-Investigating Judges 
on Ensuring Respect for Procedural Safeguards in Cases  003, 004, AND 004/2,  INT’L CRIM. L. 
BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), http://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2017/08/16/eccc-respect-procedural-
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Presently, there are several potential outcomes for Cases 003 and 
004. First, though seemingly unlikely at this juncture, the United 
Nations and donor communities might ultimately successfully pressure 
the Cambodian government to move the cases forward to trial. Second, 
the Co-Investigating Judges could conclude that none of the remaining 
suspects qualify as senior leaders or most responsible individuals 
falling under the Court’s personal jurisdiction and dismiss the charges 
against all of them.249 Third, the Court itself could simply close prior 
to trial due to lack of funding. Fourth, the United Nations and donor 
countries could end their support of the ECCC due to the Cambodian 
government’s clear interference. Fifth, the Co-Investigating Judges or 
Pre-Trial Chamber could find that the appearance of outside 
interference and/or fair trial concerns related to the actual conduct of 
the relevant investigations necessitates a stay of proceedings in the two 
cases. 
Each of these potential outcomes entails mixed, even potentially 
conflicting, domestic rule of law ramifications. First, should the cases 
be dismissed based on a finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction, this 
outcome will surely be interpreted as a product of the CPP’s 
interference in the work of the ECCC. This interpretation appears 
inevitable regardless of whether the two Co-Investigating Judges 
themselves, or other relevant ECCC actors, subjectively believe that 
such a finding is wholly grounded in “objective” legal reasoning. 
Absent the publication of public decisions outlining compelling 
reasons why available evidence does not support a finding of the 
suspects as “most responsible,” any decision to this effect is bound to 
be viewed as a mere pretext. That the CPP regularly manipulates 
domestic courts, that Hun Sen has repeatedly explicitly and implicitly 
stated the CPP’s opposition to Cases 003 and 004,250 that there is 
 
safeguards/ [https://perma.cc/9MX3-XH63] [hereinafter Karnavas, ECCC Co-Investigating 
Judges]; Erin Handley, Im Chaem Defence Lauds Decision, PHNOM PENH POST (July 13, 2017) 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/im-chaem-defence-lauds-decision 
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that the dismissal demonstrates that “[T]he International Co-Prosecutor’s assessment [that Im 
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249. This outcome would likely trigger further appeals by the International Co-Prosecutor, 
the outcome of which would be in the hands of the Pre-Trial and potentially Supreme Court 
Chambers. 
250. It is likely true that, as some commentators have argued, the CPP’s stance concerning 
Cases 003 and 004 has fluctuated and is not necessarily one of complete opposition. See 
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division within the ECCC itself between Cambodian staffers and their 
international counterparts concerning the cases, and rumors that certain 
suspects in the cases have received “assurances” from the Cambodian 
government that the cases would not proceed,251 all create a familiar 
picture of selective, highly politicized impunity in Cambodia. This 
interpretation is buttressed by the implicit agreement of all relevant 
parties (both Co-Prosecutors, both Co-Investigating Judges, and the 
judges of the Pre-Trial, Trial and Supreme Court Chambers) that Duch 
qualifies as “most responsible.”252 
The second potential outcome, signaled by the Co-Investigating 
Judges’ consideration of staying the charges against Ao An, Yim Tith 
and Meas Muth due to funding shortfalls,253 is that concerns for the fair 
trial rights of the suspects in the cases will be used to legally justify not 
moving forward with trials. While fair trial rights are undoubtedly a 
core aspect of the kind of human rights-based conception of the rule of 
law espoused by transitional justice and ICL advocates, this approach 
is also unlikely to set a positive rule of law example, at least the way 
such concerns have been formulated thus far. Regardless of how 
narrowly the Co-Investigating Judges, or for that matter, other ECCC 
judicial chambers, interpret the ambit of the ECCC’s personal 
jurisdiction, unless they are willing to revisit the decision to move 
forward with the trial of Duch, grounding any personal jurisdictional 
decision in fair trial rights will appear to most observers, especially 
Cambodians well-acquainted with similar machinations at the domestic 
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mulled [https://perma.cc/S33A-79QZ]. 
252. See Prosecutor v.  Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch,” Appeal Judgment, Case No. 001/18-
07-2007-ECCC/SC, 43 (Supreme Court Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Feb. 3, 2012). 
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level, to be a pretext for the decision not to move forward with trials 
that the CPP publicly opposes. 
This is not to suggest that there may not be ample grounds for 
discontinuing the cases based on violations of the suspects’ fair trial 
rights. There is significant evidence that the integrity of the Case 003 
and 004 investigations has been significantly compromised. 
International ECCC staff have quit over what they viewed as 
irregularities in these investigations, and various reports and rumors of 
government interference and ECCC staffers blocking or otherwise 
interfering with the investigations have emerged in the nearly decade 
since the investigations started.254 While many of these problems have 
been attributed to efforts by the CPP (and national ECCC staff 
members working to effectuate the perceived wishes of the CPP) to 
undermine the investigations, the Co-Investigating Judges, or the 
United Nations itself, could determine that the integrity of the cases has 
been so compromised as to preclude any way forward in accordance 
with fair trial standards.255 For such an outcome to be legitimated 
however, the judges, or the United Nations itself, would need to 
explicitly acknowledge the ECCC’s clear failure in these cases and to 
openly discuss relevant findings concerning how the cases were 
undermined. 
This outcome, pre- or mid-trial, would, from a rule of law 
perspective, be perhaps the most desirable one. If maintaining 
scrupulous adherence to the rule of law principles the United Nations 
itself espouses, including fair trial standards, and setting a positive 
example in this regard, were top priorities of the ECCC, the Court 
would need to openly assess its own shortcomings in adhering to the 
requirements of the rule of law. If the investigations were so interfered 
with and flawed as to be fundamentally compromised, then Court 
actors, such as the Co-Investigating Judges, could acknowledge this 
and explain how this process happened. This would likely involve 
calling out the CPP for failing to fully cooperate with the Court and for 
publicly stating the government’s opposition to Cases 003 and 004. It 
would also likely involve the exposure of potentially embarrassing 
failures on the part of the United Nations and the ECCC’s international 
 
254. See, e.g., KASPER-ANSERMET, supra note 179; PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION, 
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staff to move the investigations forward while maintaining their 
integrity. Given the allegations made against select international staff, 
such as former Co-Investigating Judge Siegfried Blunk,256 such a 
process could also involve uncomfortable admissions of the United 
Nations and the international community’s own failings in ensuring 
that the ECCC abides by the rule of law. Moreover, defense teams at 
the ECCC, including in Cases 001 and 002, have repeatedly argued that 
government interference and irregularities at the Court have 
compromised their clients’ fair trial rights.257 The United Nations has 
reportedly maintained a firm position that the verdicts in Cases 001 and 
especially 002 must be preserved at all costs and, as such, largely 
because an investigation into government interference into the Case 
003 and 004 investigations could “open the door” to defense challenges 
in Case 002, the United Nations declined to conduct such an 
investigation in 2011.258 
Such an honest process of critical reflection of the ECCC’s rule 
of law shortcomings is perhaps the least likely outcome. The United 
Nations and donor states have shown little interest in conducting 
thorough, transparent investigations into prior allegations of 
malfeasance and political interference at the ECCC, and there is little 
reason to think this will change. After years of protracted negotiations 
to create the ECCC and many hundreds of millions of dollars spent on 
the Court since it began operations,259 those invested in the ECCC are 
likely interested in fostering a positive narrative of the Court and its 
legacy for Cambodia. Investigating impropriety and political 
interference at the Court or shutting it down abruptly due to 
investigatory irregularities, are apt to be seen as outcomes that would 
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tarnish the ECCC’s already uncertain legacy. It is also unlikely that the 
ECCC itself will engage in any form of thorough and transparent 
analysis of its own shortcomings. As the Court’s primary investigative 
organ, the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges is best-positioned to 
examine investigatory irregularities, and other such actions. However, 
most allegations and rumors of such irregularities focus on the work of 
the Co-Investigating Judges themselves,260 making such an outcome 
highly unlikely. 
The choice to prioritize ensuring the finality of the Case 001 and 
002 verdicts at the cost of Cases 003 and 004 is, to some degree, quite 
understandable. The ECCC issuing zero final judgments would surely 
raise the ire of many survivors and be perceived as a waste of money 
by donors. It does however, entail significant opportunity costs related 
to the Court’s rule of law implications, including domestically in 
Cambodia. First, should Cases 003 and 004 be dismissed prior to trial, 
this outcome will be broadly interpreted, especially within Cambodia, 
as yet another example of the CPP wielding its influence to determine 
who will and will not be criminally prosecuted. The United Nations and 
the Court’s donors risk implicating themselves in this process, and in 
doing so, suggesting that the rule of law consists solely of procedural 
requirements that can be conveniently manipulated to serve the 
interests of power. More specifically, absent the release of compelling, 
public reasons why Cases 003 and 004 should not proceed, the 
dismissal of these cases would suggest that the rule of law can tolerate 
selective application of the law and the inconsistent, seemingly 
conflicting interpretation of vague provisions, such as the 
determination of whom is to be deemed legally “most responsible” for 
crimes. The rule of law, at least as conceived of by Fuller and in the 
UN Secretary-General’s 2004 report, cannot tolerate such selectivity, 
lack of clarity, internal contradiction, and incongruence between the 
substance and application of the law.261 
If Cases 003 and 004 proceed to this likely conclusion, the ECCC 
may not only lend legitimacy to the CPP’s extremely narrow, 
proceduralist view of the rule of law, but may also build the capacity 
of Cambodian legal actors working at the Court to construct more 
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convincing legal façades, or in the words of Dyzenhaus, “pretenses” of 
legality.262 This danger has been recognized by ECCC defense counsel 
Michael Karnavas, who John Ciorciari and Anne Heindel quote as 
rhetorically asking “[a]re we not teaching additional skills to our local 
counterparts on how to avoid the application of the rule of law? I think 
this is going to be the darkest part of [the ECCC’s] legacy.”263 A 
Cambodian ECCC staffer put this risk more succinctly, observing that 
“[w]hen you give them a knife, they can use it,” referring to the 
Cambodian government’s savvy wielding of legal and other tools 
against its opponents.264 These fears appear to be at risk of 
materializing because of the United Nations’ and donor community’s 
desire to protect the Cases 001 and 002 verdicts at all costs, itself an 
example of what McAuliffe refers to as an emphasis on “outcomes” 
over “processes” at ICL institutions, which undermines their rule of 
law effects.265 This emphasis, and the corresponding perceived need to 
avoid ECCC defense counsel from having a “field day” with the mere 
existence, let alone results, of any inquiry into interference with Cases 
003 and 004,266 has led to a situation wherein the Court risks 
contributing to the further erosion of the rule of law in Cambodia, rather 
than serving as a catalyst for true rule of law reform. While the Court’s 
mere existence, and its publication of Khmer-language legal texts and 
decisions discussing fair trial and due process rights, may, in the long 
run, serve as an important resource for rule of law reform efforts in 
Cambodia, in the near term, the Court is at risk of being pulled into the 
empty cycles of legality that currently abound in Cambodia, whereby 
the rule of law is subverted through pretenses of legality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated the falsity of the widespread 
assumption that the relationship between international criminal justice 
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and the domestic rule of law in post-atrocity states is necessarily a 
positive one. While the argument that this relationship may be quite 
complicated is not especially novel or new, using the ECCC experience 
in Cambodia as a case study, this Article highlights the typically 
ignored possibility that ICL prosecutions may actually have a mix of 
positive, nil, and negative effects on the domestic rule of law, at least 
in the short run. In the Cambodian context, this risk is quite real and, 
arguably, in the process of being realized. The unwillingness of the 
United Nations, donor states, and the international staff at the ECCC to 
directly acknowledge and grapple with the consequences of the 
Cambodian government’s repeated politicization of, and interference 
with, the Court’s work, including in relation to Cases 003 and 004, has 
produced potentially harmful consequences to the rule of law in 
Cambodia. These consequences are most visible when viewed in light 
of the particularities of Cambodia’s current rule of law deficit, which 
increasingly stems from government practices of subverting the rule of 
law through means obscured behind façades of legality. The ECCC’s 
tacit toleration of the CPP’s apparent interference with the Court’s 
investigations, proceedings, and judicial decision-making risks 
legitimating the notion that the rule of law is mere window dressing, 
rather than anything of substance in even the most basic, procedural 
sense. 
Perhaps the only course of action to be taken by the Court, its 
international backers, and the United Nations to promote the rule of law 
in Cambodia is a policy of extreme transparency; one that lays bare the 
Court’s own rule of law shortcomings, presents them as unacceptable, 
and carefully explains how they impair the rule of law. However, given 
the investments that the United Nations, donor countries, international 
staff, and backers of the ECCC have made in the Court thus far, the 
likelihood of such an honest, fulsome admission is remote. As such, 
there exists a real danger that the ECCC may have a negative rule of 
law legacy within Cambodia, by ignoring government interference and 
tolerating the selective, incoherent application of relevant laws, while 
also building the capacity of Cambodian legal actors to construct more 
convincing façades of legality to obscure the illegality of such 
processes. Only time will tell whether protecting the ECCC’s 
convictions of Duch, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan will ultimately 
be worth such deep rule of law compromises. 
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